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Abstract:   
As  part  of  a  series  of  related  papers,  the  authors  examine  the  conceptual 
foundations of German and American corporate governance, specifically highlighting the 
role of banks’ relationships to corporations and the stock market.  This paper focuses on 
how the regulatory and macroeconomic environments of the two countries helped shape 
how banks, especially money-centred bankers, actually interacted with their clients.  Prior 
to 1914, despite many regulatory obstacles, American banks wielded more power over 
U.S.  corporations  than  the  legendary  German  ones  because  they  had  more 
“opportunities” for intervention. The U.S. suffered larger booms and busts (“panics” and 
bankruptcies), had more foreign investment, as well as saw more corporate consolidation 
than in Germany.  By contrast, German companies seemed to have less need for active 
bank management and largely maintained their distance from activist banks, although 
German banks could potentially wield great power through board membership and proxy 
voting.  Additionally, German regulators and investors turned more readily to banks to 
bolster controls on equity and debt capital markets to dampen dangerous speculation of 
“productive assets.” They encouraged banks to play a crucial intermediary role in solving 
the  agency  problem  in  firms  and  correcting  the  perceived  weaknesses  of  financial 
markets—unlike U.S. regulators.  Germans also expected banks to save companies from 
financial distress, but these occasions were more rare in Germany than in the United 
States.   
Surprisingly, the debates in Germany and the U.S. about the role of banks had 
many common features, yet the two countries increasingly found alternative solutions to 
classic corporate governance dilemmas. Whereas American regulators tended to suspect 
banks’ insider relationship with companies and stock markets, and then endeavored to 
destroy this “money trust,” German regulators turned to banks as institutional stabilizers 
to  tame  market  turbulence  and  speculation.  Over  time,  they  bolstered  rather  than 
undermined banks’ special relationship to firms and capital markets. Key institutional 
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Q.: Taking the present situation as you find it, Mr. Reynolds, what is your 
judgment as to whether that situation [concentration of the control of 
money and credit] is a menace? 
A.:  I am inclined to think that the concentration, having gone to the extent 
it has, does constitute a menace.  I wish again, however, to qualify that by 
saying that I do not mean to sit in judgment upon anybody who controls 
that, because I do not pretend to know whether they have used it fairly or 
honestly or otherwise.
1 
(Transcript of Mr. Reynolds, President of the Continental & Commercial 
National Bank of Chicago, answering questions at the Pujo Commission 
1912/1913) 
 
For all of these forms of concentration of capital and power provide the 
central headquarters with a more exact overview of the general state of 
industry and the needs and cycles of individual industrial branches, in 
addition to a thorough knowledge of the condition of property, 
creditworthiness and trustworthiness of an extensive circle of clients.  
Both [are accomplished] through knowledgeable and objective reports to 
such information services, which on one hand are well versed in local 
circumstances and, on the other hand, are closely related to and friendly 
with the central headquarters. 
Through these methods that provide an exact oversight and detailed 
knowledge, the central headquarters gains increasing potential: 
a) to find a broad and secure basis for the sale of its issuing securities, 
which it can purchase in ever greater extent and with greater patience, 
combined with the certainty that these securities in respect to their lasting 
capital value will find their way into the hands of good buyers.  Therefore, 
they will not be so quickly thrown back on to the market and have to be 
resold…..
2 
(Jacob Riesser, President of the Central Association of German Banks and 
Bankers, in Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der deutschen Grossbanken 






                                                 
1 [Pujo] Report of the Committee Appointed Pursuant to House Resolutions 429 and 504 to Investigate the 
Concentration of Control of Money and Credit, February 28, 1913 (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1913). 
2 Jacob Riesser, Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der deutschen Grossbanken mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die 
Konzentrationsbestrebungen (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1906), p. 292.  In English, Riesser, The German Great 
Banks  and  their  Concentration,  published  by  the  National  Monetary  Commission  (Washington,  DC: 





































8  3 
I. Introduction 
Over the past fifteen years, a voluminous wave of corporate governance studies 
debating  the  proper  control  of  corporations  has  become  an  important  part  of 
contemporary academic and business discussions.  In our current environment of scandals 
and competing systems, none of which seems able to inspire a global consensus around a 
set of economic, social or ethical goods to which the corporation should dedicate itself, it 
understandable that the study “the direction and performance of corporations” occupies a 
central stage in management and popular literature.
3 Yet less studied and well understood 
is how and why different national systems of corporate governance evolved, and how 
various national systems and institutions influenced each other’s development from  a 
transnational  or  comparative  perspective.
4    Prior  to  1914  and  now,  massive flows  of 
cross-border capital investment, spearheaded by banks and other financial institutions 
were an integral part of globalization, and they placed much pressure on national systems 
of corporate governance and financial reporting to conform to “internationally accepted 
practices,” which today ironically – and largely incorrectly – is associated with American 
standards, to which world markets are ostensibly and relentlessly converging.  As two 
corporate law scholars recently declared: “The triumph of the shareholder-oriented model 
of the corporation over its principal competitors is now assured.
5 The issue has become 
even  more  acute  as  new  emerging  markets  search  for  an  appropriate  mixture  of 
indigenous institutions and borrowed foreign ones—as did countries “emerging” prior to 
1914. 
Although some political scientists such as Gregory Jackson or Sigurt Vitols have 
integrated  a historical perspective, historians have engaged only sporadically in these 
                                                 
3 Robert Monks and Nell Minow, Corporate Governance (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwells, 1995), p. 1. For 
a good discussion of the multifaceted influences on why corporate governance systems diverged, see also 
Randall  Morck,  “The  Global  History  of  Corporate  Governance:  An  Introduction,”  in  A  History  of 
Corporate  Governance  around  the  World:  Family  Business  Groups  to  Professional  Managers,  (eds) 
Randall K. Morck (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), pp. 1-64.  Jeffrey R. Fear, “Constructing 
Corporations: The Cultural Conception of the Firm,” Big Business and the Wealth of Nations, (eds.) Alfred 
D. Chandler, Jr. and Takashi Hikino (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 546-574.  
4  Gary  Herrigel,  “Corporate  Governance:  History  without  Historians,”  Oxford  Handbook  of  Business 
History, (eds.) Geoffrey Jones and Jonathan Zeitlin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
5 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, “The End of History for Corporate Law,” Convergence and 





































8  4 
discussions.
6    Much  contemporary  literature  juxtaposes  a  fairly  static  and  stylized 
Continental (usually Germany as a proxy or ideal-type) or Japanese bank-based model 
against  an  “Anglo-Saxon”  capital  market  model.
7  This  literature  tends  to 
anachronistically read both countries’ corporate governance system of the present into the 
period prior to 1914 and tends to neglect historical change within national governance 
systems.  Indeed, theorizing about institutional change has become the most problematic 
issue in political science, which is increasingly turning history to shed light on these 
matters,  but  the  primary  reliance  is  still  on  variations  of  “system”  theory  and 
“institutional  complementarities.”  By  contrast,  the  economics  literature  tends  to  rely 
either  on  an  outdated  Gerschenkronian  model,  an  over-stylized  model  of  relationship 
banking (or fluid, efficient capital markets), or black-and-white anachronistic dichotomy 
of common law versus civil law difference that starkly divide capital market-oriented 
economies from bank-oriented ones.  The notion that banks play an important role in 
successful economies, especially developing ones—once near universally held—has also 
been the subject of considerable debate.  While some economists have looked to bank-
based systems as facilitators for emerging market growth or as an antidote to chaotic, 
short-term  “market-based”  systems,  others  point  to  their  persistence  as  evidence  of  a 
retarded  economic  development  through  insufficiently  developed  equity  markets. 
Caroline Fohlin even called into question whether Germany’s financial system prior to 
1914  deserves  to  be  described  bank-based  at  all  because  of  its  vibrant  market  for 
                                                 
6 See their contributions in Wolfgang Streeck and Kozo Yamamura, The Origins of Nonliberal Capitalism: 
Germany and Japan in Comparison (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). 
7 Michel Albert, Capitalism vs. Capitalism (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1993).  Glenn Morgan, 
Richard Whitley, and Eli Moen, Changing Capitalisms?: Internationalization, Institutional Change, and 
Systems of Economic Organization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).  Peter A. Hall and David 
Soskice,  Varieties  of  Capitalism:  The  Institutional  Foundations  of  Comparative  Advantage  (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001). Streeck and Yamamura, Origins of Nonliberal Capitalism. Ronald Dore, 
Stock  Market  Capitalism:  Welfare  Capitalism:  Japan  and  Germany  versus the  Anglo-Saxons  (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000).  Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks, John D. Stephens, Continuity 
and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).  Thomas K. 
McCraw,  Creating  Modern  Capitalism:  How  Entrepreneurs,  Companies,  and  Countries  Triumphed  in 
Three  Industrial  Revolutions  (Cambridge,  Mass.:  Harvard  University  Press,  1997).    J.  Rogers 
Hollingsworth  and  Robert  Boyer,  Contemporary  Capitalism:  The  Embeddedness  of  Institutions 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1997).    Jeffrey  A.  Hart,  Rival  Capitalists:  International 
Competitiveness in the United States, Japan, and Western Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992).  
Klaus J. Hopt, et. al. (eds.), Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and Emerging 
Research  (Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  1998).  S.  W.  Black  &  M.  Moersch  (eds.)  Competition  and 






































8  5 
industrial securities.  In contrast to some economic historians who have recently applied 
the distinction between bank- and market-based financial systems from the 21
st century to 
the 19
th, we too argue that before World War I these ideal types make little sense in 
describing the layout of financial markets.  In both countries, banks played an enormous 
role in the corporate governance of firms and in capital markets offering a broad range of 
services well beyond pure banking or even investment banking as practiced at the turn of 
the  21
st  century.    Finally,  there is an  astounding  disconnect  between  economists  and 
leading German business historians who have become increasingly skeptical about the 
catalyzing effects, guiding role, or alleged information advantage of banks over industry 
even  in  a  system  of  relationship  banking.  The  models  simply  do  not  fit  our  close 
empirical research of the Deutsche Bank, Schering, Thyssen, Stinnes, Siemens, or among 
other capital-intensive industries such as chemicals, coal and steel, or electrotechnical 
industries with significant bank involvement, leaving aside the vast area of the important 
German Mittelstand, which was neglected by the big investment banks until the 1960s 
and is still largely neglected by the literature.
8 
                                                 
8  Ross  Levine  and  Aslı  Demirgüç-Kunt  (eds.),  Financial  Structure  and  Economic  Growth:  A  Cross-
Country Comparison of Banks, Markets, and Development (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001). Levine 
shows that at a historical, macroeconomic level bank-based systems can contribute to economic growth 
(GDP) just  as  effectively  as  capital markets—or  at least  they  do  not  necessarily  underperform.    Both 
systems  channel  capital  to  firms  in  different  manners  and  thus  have  different  microeconomic  and 
institutional consequences. Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1966). Contrast Marco Da Rin and Thomas Hellmann, “Banks as Catalysts 
for  Industrialization,”  Journal  of  Financial  Intermediation,  11  (2002),  366-397  that  follows  the  older 
Gerschenkronian position with Caroline Fohlin, “Universal Banking in Pre-World War I Germany: Model 
or Myth?, Explorations in Economic History, Vol. 36 (1999), pp. 305-344. Sheilagh Olgilvie and Jeremy 
Edwards, “Universal Banks and German Industrialization: A Reappraisal,” Economic History Review, 49, 3 
(1996), pp. 427-446 provides a brief overview of this new literature in English. The revision in business 
history  begins  with  Volker  Wellhöner,  Großbanken  und  Großindustrie  im  Kaiserreich  (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck  &  Ruprecht,  1989).  Caroline  Fohlin  offers  the  most  sustained  revision  of  the 
Gerschenkronian view in her recent book, Finance Capitalism and Germany’s Rise to Industrial Power 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2007)  and  her  numerous  related  articles  offered  in  the 
bibliography. It builds on range of literature questioning bank guidance of industrial strategy.  See Harald 
Wixforth, Banken und Schwerindustrie in der Weimarer Republik (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 1995). Wilfried 
Feldenkirchen,  „Zur  Finanzierung  von  Grossunternehmen  in  der  chemischen  und  elektrotechnischen 
Industrie  Deutschlands  vor  dem  Ersten  Weltkrieg,“  Beiträge  zur  quantitativen  vergleichenden 
Unternehmensgeschichte, (Hg.) Richard Tilly (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 1985), pp. 94-130.  Dietmar Petzina 
(Hg.) Zur Geschichte der Unternehmensfinanzierung (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1990).  In English, see 
Jeremy Edwards and Klaus Fischer, Banks, Finance, and Investment in Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994).  William Carney, “Large Bank Stockholders in Germany: Saviors or Substitutes,” 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 9, Winter 1997.  Timothy Guinnane, “Delegated Monitors, 
Large and Small: Germany’s Banking System, 1800-1914,” Journal of Economic Literature XL (2002), pp. 
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For some social science studies of the German economic system, moreover, only 
statistics  seem  to  count  as  evidence  of  the  measure  of  the  role  of  banks.    Although 
providing important  data,  some  of the  conclusions  of  these  studies suffer  from  over-
aggregation  of  data  and  insufficient  historical  contextualization  and  analysis  of  their 
meaning.
9   
Relying on a historical narrative, we argue here that bankers on corporate boards 
and in securities markets in both the U.S. and Germany, the two most important emerging 
markets  of  the  late  19
th  century,  served  as  necessary  “Gatekeepers”  or  “special 
intermediaries” performing a wide range of activities in these nascent financial markets.
10 
We too believe that the traditional Gerschenkronian view about the dominance or guiding 
role  of  the  great  German  universal  banks  needs  tempering.  And  counterintuitive  to 
received wisdom, we will argue that no Berlin-based German universal bank wielded the 
power of a J.P. Morgan or other major New York investment houses. American bankers 
were just as present in U.S. firms as their German counterparts, in some crucial respects 
even more.  Yet it was not the power or guiding role that made German banks different 
but their universalism, the range of services they could offer firms as all-purpose clients 
(not guides) that was the crucial difference between the U.S. and Germany.  It is less a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Finanzmarkt-Kapitalismus: Analysen zum Wandel von Produktionsregimen (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, 2005),  pp.  316-330.  Caroline  Fohlin,  “The  History  of  Corporate  Ownership  and 
Control in Germany,” in Randall K. Morck, ed. A History of Corporate Governance around the World 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), pp. 223-277.  Caroline Fohlin, “Does Civil Law Tradition 
(and Universal Banking) Crowd out Securities Markets?: Pre-World War I Germany as Counter-Example,” 
Enterprise  and  Society  (forthcoming).    Richard  Deeg,  Finance  Capitalism  Unveiled:  Banks  and  the 
German  Political  Economy  (Ann  Arbor:  University  of  Michigan  Press,  1999).    Jan  P.  Krahnen  and 
Reinhard H. Schmidt, The German Financial System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) offers the 
best contemporary overview in English. For an exception to the rule, see Timothy Guinnane, “Cooperatives 
as Information Machines: German Rural Credit Cooperatives, 1883-1914,” Journal of Economic History, 
61/2 (2001), pp. 366-389. 
9 See Fohlin’s Finance Capitalism and Germany’s Rise to Industrial Power.  Fohlin compares German 
firms’  leverage  ratios  and  financial  returns  with  bank  involvement,  and  finds  that  increased  bank-
involvement has no correlation with better use of leverage and higher profitability. Moreover, in the light of 
low income tax rates before World War I, the gearing ratios of the German companies might be interpreted 
as extraordinarily high.     
10  See  John  C.  Coffee,  Gatekeepers:  The  Professions  and  Corporate  Governance  (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 2006). Coffee stresses the wide range of services that accountants and other professional 
groups play in regulating financial markets in much the same way we discuss banks in Germany and the 
United States in 1900. Eugene N. White, “Were Banks Special Intermediaries in Late Nineteenth Century 
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question  of  their  relative  (un)importance,  but  of  their  increasingly  different  roles, 
perceived or otherwise.  In Germany, banks served as a kind of insurance for the system; 
as with insurance, banks’ involvement became more extensive when there was a problem.  
Although banks clearly had relationships with untroubled companies, one of their many 
economic services was to intercede with distressed ones. Germany regulators expected 
banks  to  expand  their  role  and  the  services  banks  offered,  rather  than  increasingly 
circumscribing them as in the U.S and driving them out of this role.  Indeed, German 
banks could offer almost all functions except issuing notes and mortgages. 
These dramatically different contemporary expectations and perceptions about the 
meaning of banks on board industrial firms that became institutionalized into regulation, 
and became part of the historical reality, is the heart of this article.  Fohlin too stresses the 
“impact of political, social, and cultural environments, along with historical accident, in 
molding financial systems” and the importance of historical contextualization, which we 
highlight  here  from  a  comparative  perspective.
11  Whether  banks  actively  managed 
companies or not, if investors believed that they did and were more willing to invest 
because  of  that  perception,  reliance  on  the  good  judgment  and  close  bank-client 
relationships, for example, became an important part of the Germany’s financial system.  
Some  American  bankers  such  as  J.P.  Morgan  tried  to  make  similar  arguments,  yet 
American public opinion and regulators vilified them.  Such expectations made all the 
difference in the world. 
Yet we should still not overplay the differences before 1914, possibly even before 
1933.  In both the American and German economic systems, banks played an enormous, 
but somewhat different role in the corporate governance of firms and as stock market 
intermediaries to a degree that is almost unimaginable for even the well-informed reader 
today.  A  transnational  banking  elite  understood  how  banking  worked  across  many 
countries,  leading  to  tremendous  cross-border  investment  flows.    Both  countries  had 
hybrid bank-based and capital market systems that were entwined with one another (but 
in different ways, discussed below); both were built on relationship banking with its large 
                                                 
11 Fohlin, Finance Capitalism and Germany’s Rise to Industrial Power, pp. 66, 345 Fohlin’s excellent 
study neglects the whys of regulation, just that they were put in place.  Although she makes some reference 
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major corporations; both had active stock exchanges for issuing and trading corporate 
securities.  To  be  clear,  we  are  not  claiming  that  the  two  financial  systems  were 
comparable as there are many other dimensions that we do not discuss comprehensively 
(i.e.  unit  banking  versus  branching  or  universal  banking,  different  types  of  banks, 
federalism, the ability to branch nationally, mortgages, etc.), but focus on services banks 
provided  directly  to  firms  and  in  corporate  governance,  which  are  key  features  of 
relationship banking.  One of the key virtues of relationship banking is the potential to 
rescue of firms during times of distress or financial overextension due to close bank 
involvement  (voice  and  restructuring  instead  of  exit),  which  we  argue,  was  more 
prevalent and more necessary in the U.S., so that New York investment banks had more 
power and control over U.S. corporations than Berlin banks over German firms.
12 
What is more, the vaunted corporate governance relationships of German banks in 
firms prior to 1914 were probably less important than their legislated, mediating role in 
the  stock  exchange;  regulators  encouraged dedicated  responsibility  for  the companies 
whose securities they brought to market and sold off to customers.  Because of different 
contemporary  assumptions  (many  of  which  find  their  place  in  today’s  financial 
economics literature) and fears about banking power, American legislation eventually 
erected barriers to banks engaging in the governance of corporations as well as to their 
maintaining broad powers in capital markets. For instance, the 1914 Clayton Act banned 
banks  from  simultaneously  sitting  on  rival  firms  in  the  same  business  to  prevent 
collusion, whereas German bankers regularly sat on numerous boards, allegedly pace 
Gerschenkron, to stop fraticidal competition among its children.
13 Foreign and domestic 
                                                 
12 For an insightful discussion, see Ralf Elsas and Jan Pieter Krahnen, “Universal Banks and Relationships 
with  Firms,”  in  The  German  Financial  System,  (eds.)  Jan  Pieter  Krahnen  and  Reinhard  H.  Schmidt 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 197-232.  Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: 
Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1970).  Michael C. Jensen, “The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control 
Systems,” The Journal of Finance, 48/3 (July 1993), pp. 831-880 
13 For example, Mark Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).  
Roe emphasizes the structure of the American and German political systems and different interest groups to 
explain  how  the  two  countries’  systems  of  corporate  governance  evolved.    Alexander  Gerschenkron, 
Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1966), p. 15.  Jeffrey Fear, 
Organizing Control: August Thyssen and the Construction of German Corporate Management (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 235-260 offers a critique of the role of banks in constructing 
cartels.  Fundamentally different attitudes toward competition help explain American and German stances 
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investors in the U.S. also demanded activist management for their holdings by banks, but 
American banking regulation eventually curtailed many control mechanisms enjoyed by 
German banks.  By contrast, German legislation anchored banks in company corporate 
governance and (often inadvertently) strengthened the hand of banks in the economy.
14 
Before 1914, we find more structural convergence regarding this gatekeeping role 
rather  than  divergence  along  with  surprising  parallel  debates  that  often  found  very 
different institutional solutions to combat the same problem (for instance: agency issues, 
futures  trading,  crashes  and  panics,  universal  banking,  or  banks  on  board).
15  Both 
countries wrestled with fundamental issues of building trust in large corporations and 
capital markets; “speculators” and “trusts” in both countries were strongly suspected.  
However, regulators slowly began answering these issues of establishing trust and 
control in different ways. The institutional differences we find laid the tracks for the great 
divergence after 1914.  It is a complex story, not easily reduced to one single category of 
explanation. Yet the assumptions behind these regulations and institutions—only after 
World War I—tended to lock-in a particular form of corporate governance that continues 
to influence German and American business.  The divergence between the two systems 
began around 1900 with the American financial panics and the great merger movement, 
yet picked up pace after the shock of World War I.  In contrast to Mark Roe and John 
Coffee,  we  argue  this  divergence  was  neither  caused  just  by  a  series  of  “political 
accidents” nor purely a function of each country’s legal framework, but rather of deep-
                                                 
14  Jeffrey  Fear  and  Christopher  Kobrak,  “Diverging  Paths:  Accounting  for  Corporate  Governance  in 
America  and  Germany,  Business  History  Review,  80  (Spring  2006),  pp.  1-48.  See  Jeffrey  Fear  and 
Christopher  Kobrak,  “Making  Capitalism  Respectable:  Sonderwegs  in  Germany  and  the  U.S.,” 
forthcoming.  Preliminary thinking about the impact of the 1873 Crash can be found in our conference 
paper, Jeffrey Fear and Christopher Kobrak, “Origins of German Corporate Governance and Accounting 
1870-1914:    Making  Capitalism  Respectable”  (conference  paper—presented  at  International  Economic 
History  Association,  Helsinki,  August  21-25,  2006),  available  at 
www.helsinki.fi/iehc2006/papers3/Kobrak.pdf, accessed October 12, 2006.  In these pieces we spend a 
good deal more time elucidating the cultural and political determinants of the different paths of German 
and American corporate governance systems. 
15 Louis Galambos, The Public Image of Big Business in America, 1880-1940: A Quantitative Study in 
Social  Change  (Baltimore:  Johns  Hopkins  University  Press,  1975).  David  A.  Zimmermann,  Panic: 
Markets, Crises, and Crowds in American Fiction (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).  
Jonathan Ira Levy, “Contemplating Delivery: Futures Trading and the problem of Commodity Exchange in 
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seated attitudes about capitalism that informed political decisions, legal precedents, and 
accounting standards.
16 
The paper is divided into two main sections. The first section has two parts.  The 
first describes the main activities of investment bankers in the U.S. and Germany circa 
1900, their role on corporate boards and other activities.  The second part highlights early 
20
th century discussions of the issues that played a role in regulatory debates prior to 
1914 to derive the very different assumptions regarding banking power.  The second 
section, which shows how certain base assumptions shaped legislation, has two parts.  
The  first  part  analyzes  the  early  development  of  German  corporate  governance 
(Aktienrecht)  of  1884;  and  the  second  part  narrates  the  introduction  of  important 
securities laws (Börsen- oder Wertpapiergesetz) of 1896. We tend to concentrate on the 
less familiar story of German corporate governance, but contrast them with more familiar 
U.S. developments.  We highlight especially how fundamentally different assumptions 
(or meanings) about banks on board drove institutional reforms to the great divergence. 
 
I.  Investment Banking ca. 1900  
1.1  The Meaning of Banks on Board 
Before World War I, even in the United States, where long before Glass-Steagal 
regulations limited the  activities of bankers, banks individually or in groups working 
together performed many of the functions today associated with management consultants, 
accountants,  private  equity  managers  and  stock  brokers,  in  addition  to  their  straight 
banking  and  financing  roles.    Companies  had  controllers  and  general  managers 
responsible for financial matters, but few, if any, had a Chief  Financial Officer, in a 
modern  sense.    With  the  growth  of  complicated  business  entities  and  transactions 
outstripping  the  training  of  new  management  expertise,  banks  were  not  only  the 
repository for funds but also for financial sophistication and general business acumen.   
Although Ron Chernow might have been premature in pronouncing the “death of the 
banker,” he certainly was right that the activities of bankers since their heyday in before 
                                                 
16  Roe,  Strong  Managers,  Weak  Owners.    Mark  J.  Roe,  “German  ‘Populism’  and  the  Large  Public 
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World War I, though still extraordinarily powerful in the 21




th century, money-center banks in Germany and in the United States were 
the preeminent intermediaries for all types of businesses, providing their clients with 
investment credit and a large range of services.  Not until new accounting methods, more 
fluid commercial paper and securities markets, and credit rating agencies developed were 
they slowly dislodged from this central position (Eugen White).  Some of the services 
offered  by  German  banks  were  forbidden  or  impractical  to  implement  for  American 
financial institutions for a variety of reasons. Nevertheless, the great cultural and physical 
distances that separated investors from companies, the turbulence of financial markets as 
well as the great many American restructurings also provided American banks with more 
than ample opportunity to insert themselves in the affairs of their client firms. This was 
not unusual.  Many of these activities were essential in both countries for even closely-
held companies with little need for external financing.   
It is, therefore, necessary to review those services and understand precisely who 
was delivering them around 1900.  Though still performed by banks today, many of these 
services  have  been  automated  and  routine  in  nature,  or  are  performed  more  directly 
between commercial companies and securities markets, a process often referred to as 
disintermediation. Although financial systems of Germany and the United States shared 
many  characteristics,  many  of  which  differentiated  them  both  from  today’s  financial 
world, by 1900, their distinctive economic and regulatory environments began producing 
banking systems, which were adapted to the perceived needs of customers and, most 
importantly for regulatory reformers, in the national public interest.  Indeed, precisely in 
those  sectors  deemed  by  American  reformers  as  public-service utilities, railroads  and 
utilities, did modern financial regulation, financial innovations, and accounting reforms 
begin.
18  
                                                 
17 Ron Chernow, The Death of the Banker (New York: Vintage Books, 1997). Eugene N. White, “Were 
Banks Special Intermediaries in Late Nineteenth Century America?,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
Review, (May/June 1998), pp. 13-36. 
18 Fear/Kobrak, “Diverging Paths.”  Paul Miranti, “The Mind’s Eye of Reform: The ICC’s Bureau of 
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German banking regulation, however, gave German banks a geographic and type-
of-service breadth unmatched in the United States.  As universal banks, they were free to 
take  deposits  all  over  Germany,  lend  to  corporations,  own  securities,  and  performed 
numerous  kinds  of  “consulting”  services,  all  of  which  reinforced  their  efficacy  in 
syndicates for launching domestic and foreign securities, even though Germany exported 
less capital than Britain and France.
19  Even underwriting securities, a core element of 
investment banking, played an important but not exclusive role.  For Germany, as Otto 
Jeidels, one of Germany’s leading bankers, wrote, “It has to be considered as only one 
track in an entirety, the center of which is current accounts in their broadest sense, of all 
transactions which are part of the bank’s business connection with enterprises.”
20 The 
purely investment banking function was just one part of the relationship.  Investment 
banking services accounted for less than 25% of the total profits of the three largest 
German banks. The underwriting activity was most useful as a means of gaining entry 
into firms, but because of the risks normally done in conjunction with other banks in a 
consortium.  According  to  Jeidels,  banks  recognized  that  taking  positions  in  their 
customers’ securities, which often, at least for a while accompanied the underwriting 
activity,  entailed  more  risk  for  the  bank  than  other  activities  and  required  greater 
involvement in the customers’ affairs.  Banks were obliged to “manipulate” the market to 
preserve  price  stability  and  hold  the  security  for  a  time.    Once  the  relationship  was 
created, though, other services could be offered for which the bank earned good fees, 
with less risk, and which gave the bank the opportunity to monitor, at least the short-run 
activities of their customers.
21  The whole practice of universal banking, with the point of 
the relationship begun through current account lending, was based on  cross-selling—
ironically  a  business  plan  replicated  by  Citigroup  or  Bank  of  America  today.  These 
included providing straight bank loans, issuing bank acceptances, taking deposits, and 
handling  transfers,  especially  international  ones  that  required  a  foreign  exchange 
transaction.  In reality, all these activities did not imply that the German banks controlled 
                                                 
19  Youssef  Cassis,  Capitals  of  Capital:  A  History  of  International  Financial  Centres,  1780-2005 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 110-113. 
20 Otto Jeidels, Das Verhältnis der deutschen Grossbanken zur Industrie mit besonderer Berücksichtigung 
der Eisenindustrie (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1905), p. 130. 





































8  13 
companies  in  spite  of  Finanzkapital  conspiracy  theories.  They  merely  reinforced  the 
impression that well-informed interested stakeholders exercised some oversight and that 
in times of distress the “appropriate” action could be undertaken in a timely fashion.
22 
Sitting on the boards of client companies symbolized this “fiduciary” role and 
institutionalized  the  close  connection  to  firms  in  both  countries,  but  had  many 
disadvantages for the banks as they invited unwanted public scrutiny and distrust.  After 
the  turn-of-the-century,  both  Germans  and  the  U.S.  debated  the  issue  of  interlocking 
directories and concentration of power—with good reason.  Unlike today, the role of 
bankers,  especially  helping  clients  with  mergers  and  acquisitions  or launching  public 
securities  (investment  banking)  involved  a  great  deal  more  active  management  for 
companies.  This  often  resulted  in  having  banks on  board  for  three broad  reasons:  1) 
Related lending might enhance access to capital for firms and reduce monitoring costs for 
banks as they had inside information; 2) Banks on board might act as a certification 
mechanism, a signal that firms were ongoing ventures worth of equity investment or a 
sign of creditworthiness for other lenders; 3) Entrepreneurs or corporate executives might 
want  the  advice  of  bankers  regarding  their  financial  structure  or  the  issuing  of  new 
securities.  The exact relationship would vary from firm to firm, but banks and firms 
needed one another, creating a symbiotic relationship between them.
23   
 Exhibit  1  offers  an  overview  of  the  degree  of  interlocking  directories  among 
banks and firms in both countries.  In general, interlocks grew more strongly in Germany 
than in the U.S. after 1900, but especially after 1914. 
                                                 
22 For the classic Finanzkapital interpretation, see Rudolf Hilferding, Das Finanzkapital: Eine Studie über 
die jüngste Entwicklung des Kapitalismus (Wien: Ignaz Brand & Co., 1910). A recent historiographical 
overview  on the state  of  the  literature is  provided  by  Gerald  D.  Feldman,  “Banks,  Bankenmacht,  and 
Financial Institutions from 1900 to 1933.“ 
23 Caroline Fohlin, Finance Capitalism and Germany’s Rise to Industrial Power (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), pp. 48-64.  Aldo Musacchio, “Corporate Governance and Networks: Bankers in 
the Corporate Networks of Brazil, Mexico, and the United States circa 1910” (unpublished paper).  Both 
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Exhibit 1: 
Banking Networks of Largest Firms in the United States and Germany 1896-1938 
(U.S./German) 
 
Dimension  1896/1900  1914  1928  1938 
Number of Largest Firms   249/212  242/323  369/377  409/361 
Stand-alone Firms (non-interlocked) 
(%) 
9.2/26.4  20.2/9.6  10.8/2.9  8.3/4.2 
Weakly-linked Firms (1-2 interlocks 
with other firms) (%) 
19.3/28.8  21.1/15.8  16.3/2.9  19.6/6.9 
Avg. Size of Board of Directors   13.3/7.9  14.4/12.7  17.5/21.7  16.5/15.0 
Total Number of Interlocks  1579/513  1466/3081  2538/12374  2091/6967 
Avg. Interlocks per Firm  6.34/2.42  6.05/9.54  6.88/32.8  5.11/19.3 
Density of Network*  3.2/1.61  3.34/4.23  2.49/10.8  1.64/7.0 
No. of Directed Interlocks only #  468/136  395/438  812/1416  715/1156 
Multiple Directed Interlocks (%)  12.4/5.1  10.9/7.5  10.6/15.3  8.5/14.9 
Avg. Directed Interlocks per Firm  1.88/0.64  1.63/1.36  2.2/3.76  1.75/3.2 
         
Number of Banks in Sample  46/30  49/47  62/59  77/47 
Directed Banking Interlocks to 
Industrial Firms 
122/76  137/207  258/426  262/252 
Avg. Directed Interlocks per Bank  2.7/2.5  2.8/4.4  4.2/7.2  3.4/5.4 
Industrial Firms with Banker on 
Board (%) 
32.5/25.3  36.2/40.9  43.0/59.4  46.1/48.4 
Industrial Firms with 3+ Bankers 
on Board (%) 
6.9/3.8  8.3/7.2  11.4/18.9  7.5/7.6 
Banker as Chairman/President (%)  2.5/13.7  2.1/14.5  8.5/23.0  10.2/24.8 
 
Source:  Paul Windolf, “Unternehmensverflechtung im organisierten Kapitalismus: Deutschland und USA 
im Vergleich 1896-1938, Tables 1 and 4, available at www.uni-
trier.de/uni/fb4/soziologie/apo/netzwerk1896.pdf.  U.S. 1900; Germany 1896.    
*Density of Network means the ratio of actual interlocks to the potential total ones available.   
#Directed interlocks signify that a member of the executive board of Firm A holds a position in the 
supervisory firm of Firm B; undirected interlocks mean that a person sits on the supervisory board of Firms 
A and B.  The distinction measures the degree of intentionality and potentially the tightness of control over 
another firm. 
 
Based  on  these  figures,  around  1900  one  might  argue  that  the  U.S.  had  the  more 
“organized capitalism” and bank-based economy, but by 1928 Germany evolved many of 
the attributes that have held until the 1990s.  In 1896, over 25% of large German firms 
had no interlocking directories as opposed to just 9% of American firms, but these figures 
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completely independent. The percentage of firms in both countries with 1-2 interlocks 
were roughly comparable in 1914, but diverged dramatically by 1928.  A striking result is 
that  German  firms  had  smaller  boards  of  directors  in  1900  than  American  ones,  but 
average  German  board  sizes  surpassed  American  boards  by  1928.    Also  the  average 
number of interlocks per firm were three times less in Germany around 1900, yet were 
nearly five times the American average in 1928; the density of the interlocking network 
was two times as high in the U.S. in 1900, but reversed to five times as high in Germany 
in 1928.  Executive directors sat on other firms’ boards to a greater extent in the U.S. in 
1900, roughly comparably by 1914, but they grew steadily in Germany by 1928. 
  Most counterintuitively,  banks  were  more  present  in  American  firms in  1900, 
roughly  comparable  in  1914,  but  increasingly  made  their  presence  felt  by  1928  in 
Germany.  Even in the bank-suspicious U.S., the number of banks on board increased in 
the 1920s, but more slowly than that of Germany. That nearly one-quarter of the largest 
German firms had a banker as supervisory board chair indicates the significant role that 
banks played in German capitalism.  If one of the distinctive features of the German 
model is bank representation on boards, then it must lie in this last feature because the 
U.S. also had a high proportion of interlocking directories. Armed  with a number of 
assumptions about falling profits, the increasingly long-term nature of investment, and 
(wrongly) identifying the supervisory board chair as the crucial entrepreneurial figure on 
corporate  boards,  Rudolf  Hilferding’s  1910  Finanzkapital  concluded  that  banks 
increasingly dominated industry.
24 
But bank presence on board and even share ownership is not necessarily evidence 
of bank control of corporations.  The corporate governance expert, Mark Roe, thought 
that  the  English  translation  of  ‘Aufsichtsrat’  should  really  be  translated  as  “advisory 
board,”  which  stresses  consultancy  and  influence  rather  than  control;  even  today  the 
political  costs  of  high  profile  corporate  governance  roles  could  be  significant.
25    A 
considerable literature debunks this theory and the spread of banks on boards in Germany 
                                                 
24  Rudolf  Hilferding,  Das  Finanzkapital:  Eine  Studie  über  die  jüngste  Entwicklung  des  Kapitalismus 
(Wien: Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1910).  In English, Finance Capital: A Study in the Latest Phase of 
Capitalist Development (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981). 
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is independent of their power or “dominance.” The meaning of such bank representation 
still needs calibration.   
What exactly banks’ role on German boards has been one of the most heavily 
debated  issues  in  German  history  since  the  appearance  of  Rudolf  Hilferding’s  Das 
Finanzkapital—not  surprisingly—in  1910  at  the  height  of  the  debate  about  banking 
concentration and power in both Germany and the U.S.  One German economist, Adolf 
Weber, noted that in 1902, it was difficult finding material about banks, yet by 1914 the 
mass of material and literature was overwhelming.
26  The two poles of the German debate 
about  banking  appeared  in  this  decade and have  never  really  disappeared.  Hilferding 
interpreted such interlocks, let alone, bankers holding the key position as the supervisory 
board  chair  as  a  sign  of  banking  “dominance”  and  control.    Riesser’s  book  on  the 
Concentration of German Banks appeared slightly beforehand, but addressed the same 
suspicions put on its Marxist point by Hilferding. As the above quote indicates, however, 
Riesser  viewed  such  concentration  largely  as  economically  advantageous.    He  also 
argued  that  concentration  in  a  small  number  of  large  banks  based  in  Berlin  eased 
negotiations  in  regards  the  economic  and  geopolitical  diplomacy  of  the  empire,  for 
instance, regarding submarine cables, railroads, and other colonial ventures.  Riesser took 
time to address the two main concerns of contemporaries by arguing that banking power 
over industry was “quite exaggerated;” industry dictated their own strategies—including 
cartel-building—according to their own needs, not that of banks.  He also did see some 
issues with the decline of private banks, but chalked it up to the economics of the banking 
industry that paralleled industrial concentration.  However, as long as banks had “careful 
leaders as has so far been the case” who did not overextend themselves and who retained 
their “social-political insight” and sensitivity, everything would be fine.  Riesser even 
proved sympathetic to placing a labor representative on boards of directors to responsibly 
align workers’ interests with that of the company!
27  You will not find a major business 
spokesperson in America who would even entertain such an idea.  But Riesser’s logic for 
                                                 
26  Adolf  Weber,  Depositenbanken  und  Spekulationsbanken:  Ein  Vergleich  deutschen  und  englischen 
Bankwesens (München/Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1915), p. v-vii.  A closely read, comparative analysis 
of these debates is missing. 
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banks on board, let alone providing a seat for workers, was the same—to build trust 
through voice and long-term responsibility to productive capital. 
We cannot complete a thorough review of the historical literature about banking 
dominance here, but the notion that banks wielded significant power over firms, guided 
the strategic investments of firms, or formed cartels to stop the competitive sibling rivalry 
of its corporate investments is at the very least debatable.  While noting the distinctive 
size  of  German  banks  among  the  largest  twenty-five  firms  by  book  value,  Toni 
Pierenkemper and Richard Tilly have recently argued: “It does not make much sense, we 
believe,  to  speak  of  a  ‘German  model’  of  development”  in  the  nineteenth  century.
28  
Volker  Wellhöner  largely  confirms  Riesser’s  1906  assessment  that  if  anything  banks 
followed the lead of industrialists.
29  Wellhöner demonstrated that the “prime example” 
of banking power over industry, the forcing of Phoenix into the steel cartel, was actually 
driven on by the industrialist, August Thyssen, who “frightened” banks. Many banks’ 
clients were sufficiently cash rich that they were able to dictate terms to the banks.  Large 
German industrial firms regularly played banks off of one another or developed financial 
strategies to minimize banks’ leverage over them.
30  The concentration process of the 
great German banks had to keep pace with the concentration process in German industry, 
which  outgrew  the  financing  capabilities  of  banks  (Riesser,  Wellhöner).  Wilfried 
Feldenkirchen  and  Richard  Tilly  among  others  statistically  proved  that  most  heavy 
industrial firms could rely rely on self-financing and retained earnings to finance long-
term investment, thus further reducing the power of banks. Finally, Wellhöner stressed 
the conceptual inadequacy of the idea of “dominance” or “banking power.”
31  Caroline 
                                                 
28 Toni Pierenkemper and Richard Tilly, The German Economy during the Nineteenth Century (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2005), p. 161. 
29 Riesser, Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der deutschen Grossbanken, pp. 279-306. 
30  Volker  Wellhöner,  Großbanken  und  Großindustrie  im  Kaiserreich  (Göttingen:  Vandenhoeck  & 
Ruprecht, 1989), esp. pp. 84-87 on Phoenix.  Also Jakob Tanner, „’Bankenmacht’: politischer Popanz, 
antisemitischer Sterotyp oder analytische Kategorie?,“ Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte (ZUG), 43/1 
(1998), pp. 19-34. 
31 Feldenkirchen, Eisen- und Stahlindustrie, pp. 283-303.  Wellhöner, Großbanken und Großindustrie im 
Kaiserreich,  pp.  237-244.    Volker  Wellhöner  and  Harald  Wixforth,  “Unternehmensfinanzierung  durch 
Banken—Ein Hebel zur Etablierung der Bankenherrschaft?  Ein Beitrag zum Verhältnis von Banken und 
Schwerindustrie in Deutschland während des Kaiserreichs und der Weimarer Republik,” (Hg.) Dietmar 
Petzina, Zur Geschichte der Unternehmensfinanzierung (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1990), pp. 11-33.  
On Mannesmann, see Wellhöner, Großbanken und Großindustrie im Kaiserreich, pp. 125-146; also Horst 
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Fohlin notes about the 1920s “that expanding networks of interlocking directorates may 
be associated with the weakening of ties between banks and firms rather than with the 
increasing dominion of banks over industry.” Exhibit 1 shows the dramatic expansion of 
bankers on board large firms in the 1920s, but the great interwar crises weakened banks 
ability  to  finance  and  control  dramatically.    Yet  even  before  the  1920s,  when  many 
observed a weakening of bank power over industry, banks on boards of German industry 
grew after 1890, well after industrialization was underway.
32 Even Gerschenkron noted 
that the influence of universal banks weakened after the upswing of the business cycle 
after 1895. These assessments by historians mirror the 1905 opinion of Emil Kirdorf, the 
head  of  the  largest  German  coal  company,  Gelsenkirchen,  who  said  to  resounding 
applause:  “Never has the influence of large banks on the big business  of Rhineland-
Westphalia been so low as it is at present.”
33  Riesser even suggested holding corporate 
equity reflected poorly on the ability of a bank to effectively issue shares or was planning 
to speculate with its shareholding.
34  Finally, as stressed today, such directorates might 
better  promote  cushy  cross-shareholdings  that  led  more  to  favoritism  than  a  real 
supervisory check on management executives.  Then, as now, minority shareholders on 
                                                                                                                                                 
Mannesmannröhren-Werke  AG.  1890-1907,”  (Hg.)  Petzina,  Zur  Geschichte  der 
Unternehmensfinanzierung,  pp.  119-171.    Harald  Wixforth  and  D.  Ziegler,  “Bankenmacht:  Universal 
Banking  and  German  Industry  in  Historical  Perspective,”  The  Evolution  of  Financial  Institutions  and 
Markets in Twentieth-Century Europe, (eds.) Youssef Cassis, Gerald Feldmann, and U. Olsson (Aldershot: 
Scholar Press, 1995), pp. 249-272.  For the 1920s, see Harald Wixforth, Banken und Schwerindustrie in der 
Weimarer Republik (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 1995).  Although heavy industry had considerable difficulty 
financing their investment activities after the end of the inflation, banking influence ebbed still further. 
32  Caroline  Fohlin,  “The  Rise  of  Interlocking  Directorates  in  Imperial  Germany,”  Economic  History 
Review,  52,  2  (1999),  pp.  307-333,  quote  from  p.  309.  Volker  Wellhöner  und  Harald  Wixforth, 
“Unternehmensfinanzierung durch Banken—Ein Hebel zur Etablierung der Bankenherrschaft?  Ein Beitrag 
zum  Verhältnis  von  Banken  und  Schwerindustrie  in  Deutschland  während  des  Kaiserreichs  und  der 
Weimarer  Republik,”  (Hg.)  Dietmar  Petzina,  Zur  Geschichte  der  Unternehmensfinanzierung  (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1990), pp. 11-33. Harald Wixforth, Banken und Schwerindustrie in der Weimarer 
Republik (Köln: Böhlau, 1990).  Harald Wixforth und Dieter Ziegler, “Bankenmacht: Universal Banking 
and German Industry in Historical Perspective,” The Evolution of Financial Institutions and markets in 
Twentieth-Century Europe, (eds.) Youssef Cassis, Gerald Feldmann, and U. Olsson (Aldershot: Scholar 
Press, 1995), pp. 249-272.  Dieter Ziegler, “Die Aufsichtsräte der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften in den 
zwanziger  Jahren:  Eine  empirische  Untersuchung  zum  Problem  der  ‘Bankenmacht’,”  Zeitschrift  für 
Unternehmensgeschichte, 43/2 (1998), pp. 194-215. 
33 Quoted from Emil Kirdorf’s speech at the Verein für Socialpolitik, 27/28 September 1905, reproduced in 
Kartelle in der Wirklichkeit, (Hg.) Ludwig Kastl (Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1963), p. 109. 
34  Fohlin,  Finance  Capitalism,  pp.  106-168.  Fohlin,  “Rise  of  Interlocking  Directorates,”  pp.  320-329; 
Fohlin, “Relationship Banking, Liquidity, and Investment in the German Industrialization.” See also Lothar 
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supervisory boards that provided a critical perspective on the condition of the enterprise 
were “not very popular,” according to the contemporary skeptic, Richard Passow.
35 
In  short,  the  reasons  why  banks  take  seats  on  directors’  boards  of  firms  are 
complicated, needing careful analysis of specific modalities of their relationships with 
business. Clearly, banks on boards do overcome informational assymetries.  Indeed, one 
of the clear motivations for German corporate governance reform in 1884 and 1896 after 
the disastrous 1873 founders’ crisis was to have banks on board to certify those ventures 
as creditworthy and trustworthy on stock markets (see discussions below).  If banks were 
on board, they signaled to outsiders that dedicated insiders had a stake in the firm as an 
ongoing firm, not just an insecure piece of paper floating on the winds of the speculative 
stock market.  In times of distress, banks had a stake to step in to save the firm, its 
shareholders, and its employees.  It should also not be underestimated just how desperate 
banks were, particularly in the 1920s, to appear as willing servants of productive national 
enterprises.  They  acted  as  loyal  advisors,  hoping  to  attract  the  business  of  their 
customers.    Then  as  now,  the  ability  to  cross-sell  and  be  there  when  firms  needed 
additional loans, float bonds, or issue shares.  Banks had to behave as loyal clients, not 
controllers. 
                                                 
35 Rudolf Passow, Die Aktiengesellschaft, pp. 387-461, esp. 444-447, quotes from pp. 419, 421, 422.  The 
experience of the 1920s suggest that banks desired to cultivate firms’s business and ‘being there’ on boards, 
preferably as many as possible, provided better information about firms and general developments (see the 
Riesser quote) so that when the firm needed some sort of financing the suitor bank was potentially first in 
line. Easily rolling over plain vanilla current account credits demonstrated loyalty to industrial clients, there 
to  offer  services  to  the  firm  when  something  more  important  arises:  underwriting,  financing  new 
investments, etc.—i.e. cross-selling.  One must also not forget the (lucrative) prestige factor about being on 
board a powerful, high profile industrial firm.  In the 1920s, the corporate governance expert, Richard 
Passow,  even downplayed  the  board’s  capability  of  supervising  a  firm.  Without  denying  the  potential 
economic benefits of such bank representation, Passow emphasized the prestige or “decorative” occupation 
of board seats; many board members were retirees, good friends, relatives, or just plain “royalty hunters” 
(Tantiemejäger). Often board members lacked the financial or technical competence needed, met only a 
few times a year, lived distant from the geographical vicinity of the company headquarters, ‘controlled’ on 
the  basis  of  loose  sampling,  or  worse,  used  materials  provided  by  companies’  managing  executives 
themselves. Sometimes important universal bank representatives, such as Carl Klönne or Oscar Schlitter of 
the Deutsche Bank or Jakob Goldschmidt of DANAT, sat on numerous firms or were responsible for whole 
districts like the Ruhr, lessening their ability to monitor and control effectively.  (In 1929 Goldschmidt sat 
on  around  125  firms’  supervisory  boards).  In  1914,  the  Deutsche  Bank  had  seats  in  186  different 
companies.  One individual director held 44 seats and over 100 in 1930, see Jürgen Kocka, “Big Business 
and the Rise of Managerial Capitalism: Germany in International Comparison,” Industrial Culture and 
Bourgeois Society: Business, Labor, and Bureaucracy in Modern Germany (New York: Berghahn, 1999), 
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But most importantly for our argument, whatever the specific reasons for banks 
on board, it is clear from Exhibit 1 that whatever theory applies to Germany should also 
apply to an analysis of the U.S.—at least prior to 1914. At minimum, German “organized 
capitalism,” “coordinated capitalism” or “insider governance” (Deutschland AG) began 
to  take  shape  prior  to  1914,  but  was  still  comparable  to  the  U.S.;  it  became  more 
“coordinated” or “organized” after the 1920s.  At the same time, the U.S. took its road to 
an “equity revolution;”  regulators backed  by  popular opinion  systematically  began  to 
reduce  banks  on  board  after  1914  with  legislation.    The  banks-on-board,  insider 
governance  divergence  begins  with  World  War  I,  although  key  assumptions  and 
decisions laid tracks beforehand.  
Americans grew increasingly uncomfortable with such insider governance, which 
was construed as a “money trust,” while German regulators actively encouraged such 
interlocks  because  they  thought  it  helped  tame  the  volatility  of  capital  markets,  the 
quality of securities, and the financial stability of firms.
36  This notion of ‘taming’ or 
smoothing inherently anarchic markets underlay much regulation.  The “great reversal,” 
that is, the beginning of the end of relationship banking and shift to more capital market 
orientation in the U.S. begins in the 1920s, while the war, hyperinflation, depression, and 
Third Reich near permanently wrecked Germany’s equity markets. Indeed in the 1920s 
and 1930s, the hypernationalist reasoning for these corporate interlocks to protect home 
industry came to the fore in Germany, which still did not stop Germany’s largest firms 
and municipalities from borrowing from Wall Street in the 1920s to the chagrin of many 
nationalists. 
Without  overstating  similarities,  German  banks  enjoyed  many  regulatory 
advantages for underwriting securities and maintaining close relationships with clients 
that their American counterparts did not.  In the U.S. many of the services routinely 
provided by German banks were statutorily or for other reasons open only to private 
banks or trust companies, or specialized service companies, whose sources of capital and 
control of companies were more limited than those of large public universal banks in 
                                                 
36  Donald  J.  S.  Brean  and  Christopher  Kobrak,  “Corporate  Governance  in  the  Twenty-First 
Century,” in Corporate, Public and Global Governance: The G8 Contribution, eds. Michele Fratianni, et 
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Germany.  German banks not only excelled at investment banking functions, but also 
these activities  were  complemented  by handling  “trust  accounts,” retail  deposits  over 
large  regional  areas,  auditing,  consulting  as  well as  short- and  long-term  commercial 
loans, activities which were by and large segmented among different types of banks in 
the U.S.  Nevertheless, American banks had plenty of opportunity to profit from working 
closely with companies, often in conjunction with far larger European banks.  One of the 
main functions of banks in both countries, reorganizing companies, was more prevalent 
in  the  U.S.  because  more  firms  fell  into  distress  requiring  active  management  and 
massive follow up.   
The stories of two very important American companies illustrate how new and 
troubled  companies  required  not  only  active  bank  management  but  new  investment 
practices in both Germany and the United States, especially when foreign funds were 
involved.  When Edison General Electric was launched in 1889, the bankers and other 
sponsors, many of whom were from Germany, reluctantly agreed to hold the shares until 
the moment was ripe for a public sale.  With jittery U.S. capital markets at the time, the 
syndicate leader extended the no-sale clause several times much to the chagrin of his 
partners. At the very least, the bankers wanted to keep the company on a short leash 
while their funds were tied up.  When the Edison company was merged with a competitor 
to form GE, the Germans, who had already watched their control of the old company 
diminish  and  who  knew  they  would  have  even  less  opportunity  to  influence  the 
operations of the new company because of J. P. Morgan’s predominant position, chose to 
sell  off  their  interest.    Similarly,  in  1896,  the  reorganization  of  the  Northern  Pacific 
Railroad required of the lead of American and European banks, which not only made a 
substantial  capital  commitment  but  also  active  management.    German  investors, 
especially, only agreed to the reorganization when they felt confident that their interests 
would be well represented in the new company by Deutsche Bank representatives, along 
with the J. P. Morgan and other American bankers.  The Voting Trust to oversee the 
railroad lasted five years.
37    
                                                 
37 Christopher Kobrak, Banking on Global Markets: Deutsche Bank and the United States, 1870 to the 
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Generally, as these stories illustrate, banks in 1900 were generally not anxious to 
take large positions in companies, especially if they could not control firms, but often 
shareholding was unavoidable.  In Germany, quite simply, banks were expected to hold 
enough of their clients’ securities to gradually bring issues on to the market and keep 
share prices stable (see the lead Riesser quote).  The objectives and role that the large 
Berlin-based  banks  played  on  the  stock  market  (not  necessarily  in  the  corporate 
governance of companies or as substitute entrepreneurs) and the range of services offered 
by  one-shop,  universal  banks  were  the  crucial  differences  in  bank-firm  relationships 
between the two countries. 
Maintaining  these  activities,  the  universal  approach  to  banking  services,  was 
never really questioned in Germany.  Although the Germany banking sector was highly 
segmented into  its famous “three  pillar”  structure (large  commercial  universal  banks, 
savings banks, and cooperatives), the breadth of activities of the large public universal 
banks gave them much more potential influence than their American counterparts. A look 
at their revenues and profits will help understand their businesses. By 1900, Deutsche 
Bank, for example, had recognized that holding on to large amounts of securities entailed 
many  risks.    Apart  from  short  periods,  which  signified  distress  in  companies,  the 
securities owned by Deutsche Bank directly rarely exceeded 10% of the banks total assets 
before 1910.  Far more assets – roughly from three to four times more – was tied up in 
bank acceptances and bills of exchange, which corresponded to foreign exchange trading.  
By 1900, trading in securities had fallen to approximately 6% of total revenues, roughly 
the same amount as bank acceptances and roughly one-third the revenue contribution of 
dealing in bills of exchange.
38  Any client engaged in foreign business, then, needed the 
services of a large bank, at the very least to process payments and handle trade payments, 
services which often called on a bank to vouchsafe the credit worthiness of its client to 
others. 
While  underwriting  clients’  securities  was  an  important  service,  contrary  to 
popular opinion, investing and holding equity or debt positions in client companies were 
not important activities of banks in Germany or the U.S. As the Edison and Northern 
                                                 
38 Walter Hook, Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung der ehemaligen Deutschen Bank im Spiegel ihrer Bilanzen 
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Pacific stories illustrate, Riesser felt that if banks held large industrial shareholdings, it 
was  a  sign  of  poor  performance:  “…excessive  holdings  of  securities  would 
understandably be interpreted to mean either that the times were not been propitious for 
the issue businesses of the bank, or that it maintains excessive speculative engagements, 
or  that  it  is  involved  to  an  excessive  extent  in  speculative  transactions  on  its  own 
account…or, finally, that it has been unable to find sufficiently profitable employment for 
its funds.”
39   
Like their German counterparts, national banks did not own a great many of the 
securities launched by their corporate clients.  In 1900, the vast majority of the assets of 
National  City  Bank  were  in  straight  short-term  or  long-term  loans  and  government 
securities; just over 10% were in the form of securities issued by private companies.
40 
National  City  earned  a  great  deal  of  its  income  from  foreign  exchange  trading  and 
discounting bank acceptances drafted in London.
41  Unlike European continental banks, 
National  City’s  powerful  position  as  a  U.S.  investment  bank  was  based  on  the 
combination of its corporate deposits, correspondent relationships, and partnerships with 
private  banks  whose  own  funds  were  limited.    They  had  to  borrow  from  banks  like 
National  City  to  hold  securities,  even  those  they  were  merely  distributing  to  other 
investors.  As with private equity today, riding out soft patches in the market to sell 
securities gradually required the private banks to have financial back-up from the public 
banks.
42  These loans added to the costs and risks of issuing securities, a problem that was 
somewhat  alleviated  in  Germany  by  internalizing  the  source  of  funds  as  well  as  the 
distribution of securities.  Although German banks worked in syndicates too, the capacity 
of the big banks like Deutsche Bank to underwrite the issue, finance the holding period, 
and  speed  up  distribution  internally  gave  them  a  huge  advantage  over  their  smaller 
competitors, an advantage that neither private nor public banks had in the U.S. 
One service – holding and administering customers’ securities bequeathing proxy 
voting rights—which German banks could perform and contributed to their influence in 
companies, could not be performed at all by American commercial banks.  Only trust 
                                                 
39 Riesser, German Great Banks (1911), pp. 402-404, quoted in Fohlin, Finance Capitalism, p. 107.  
40 Citibank, p. 50. 
41 Citibank, p. 43. 
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companies could hold securities accounts; some U.S. trust companies even became active 
managers  of  the  funds  entrusted  to  them.  Originally  designed  to  serve  the  relatively 
wealthy, after the passage of the National Banking Act (1864) trust companies had the 
power to receive deposits of money and securities and to purchase securities of business 
firms, but they could also moved into traditional banking areas.  Reflecting the important 
market niche they filled, their numbers grew from 42 in 1886 to 1564 in 1914.  By one 
estimate, they enjoyed a 25 fold increase in their assets during the same period.
43  They 
performed many of the securities administrative functions in the U.S. that universal banks 
did in Germany.   
As an off balance sheet activity and one that was not discussed in annual reports, 
however, it is hard to know the exact extent of this activity was in Germany.  We do 
know that it was extensive and held many advantages for all concerned—except the large 
banks’  competitors.    Holding  securities  by  banks  was  already  a  widespread  practice 
before World War I.  Customers often allowed banks to vote their shares for them at 
annual meetings, although the practice was not highly regulated or even controlled by 
banks’ own policies.  According to one expert historian on German banks, from the turn 
of the century on, with a few exceptions, large banks cast the vast majority of votes at 
annual meetings, although the actual amount varied widely from year to year.
44  Still the 
question remains how German banks actually used this potential influence (discussed 
further below in Section 2). 
For  the  most  part,  in  Germany  the  practice  of  entrusting  administration  of 
securities to banks and allowing the banks to vote shares was perceived to have many 
advantages, seemingly for all concerned.  There were the obvious advantages for the 
clients: safety; collection of dividends and interests, especially for foreign securities, and 
overseeing changes to the form of securities, for example, when debt was exchanged for 
equity; or travel expenses.
45  Like today, one can easily imagine that few shareholders 
wanted to take the time to review financial information, oversee managers, and go to 
                                                 
43  Eugene  Nelson  White,  The  Regulation  and  Reform  of  the  American  Banking  System,  1900  -1929 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 70-71. 
44 Wellhöner, p. 80. 
45  Carl  Otto  Stünzner,  Banken  und  Wertpapierbörse:  Beiträge  zu  der  Stellung  der  Banken  auf  dem 
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shareholder meetings to vote their opinions.  Banks’ influence on companies, then, was 
not built just on their power to bring issues to market, for which the depot accounts were 
no  doubt  also  useful,  or  to  lend,  but  rather  on  their  network  of  branches,  each  with 
customers willing to deposit their securities, whose voting power was controlled by the 
bank.  Indeed, the post-1891 initiative that led to the passing of the Bank Deposit Law of 
1896  (Bankdepotgesetz)  began  as  the  large  Berlin  banks  with  their  special  role  as 
intermediaries on the Berlin stock exchange were voting and trading shares of stock held 
in deposit for local bankers (who in turn held shares for individual customers) without the 
permission  of  the  individual  shareholders  and  with  disastrous  results.
46  As  will  be 
discussed in greater depth, customers could also avoid the Stamp Tax when buying or 
selling shares through the bank.  These customers probably expected to be the recipients 
of privileged information and to have first shot at new issues brought to market by the 
bank, which was expected to give its assurances about the quality of the issue.  The State, 
for its part, expected that the banks would use their power to establish and maintain “fair 
prices” for securities and, thereby, to avoid “haphazard” price fluctuations.  The banks 
helped companies insure that votes would be cast at annually meetings – and probably 
how – avoiding unnecessary embarrassment or worse for management.   Early on, banks 
recognized that this power could be a double-edged sword.
47   Voting shares added to the 
perception that the banks were carefully overseeing a company’s activities, making them 
more responsible should the company fail to fulfill expectations. 
It is important to understand the organization and procedures of annual meetings 
in Germany.  To vote at the meetings, shareholders had to have their ownership interest 
certified with the company, with designated banks or with a German notary, a process 
made  easier  for  those  whose  shares  were  already  deposited  with  a  bank.
48    While 
agreements  prior  to  1900  make  no  mention  of  voting  at  annual  meetings,  by  1910, 
Deutsche Bank deposit conditions with clients stipulated that the bank maintained the 
right to vote shares in the interest of its “business friends” unless “in individual cases the 
                                                 
46 Jacob Riesser, Das Bankdepotgesetz (Berlin: Otto Liebmann, 1924). 
47 Letter from E. Rathenau and F. Deutsch (Deutsche Edison Gesellschaft) to Deutsche Bank, May 8, 1887, 
in Manfred Pohl, Emil Rathenau und die AEG (Mainz: Hase und Koehler, 1988), p. 67. 
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client intends to.”
49  Banks actually organized the lists of shares that had been certified.  
Larger banks, such as Deutsche Bank or the Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft, even voted 
the shares of smaller banks, especially those from outside of Berlin.  Smaller banks or 
their clients may have owned the shares themselves.
50  At some meetings, large banks 
cast  virtually  all  the  votes.
51  Remarkably,  the  German  Bankenquete  of  1908,  the 
Reichstags examination of the German banking system which followed the worldwide 
financial crisis in 1907, makes no mention of German banks near automatic voting of 
their clients’ shares.
52 
Despite their attempts to demur and some public criticism even before 1914, the 
practice was widespread before and after World War I.  Even some scholars who have 
cast doubt about the power of banks in the German economy have backtracked about the 
importance  of  proxy  voting  and  come  to  recognize  the  virtual  unparalleled  potential 
influence banks could exert due to this widespread practice, perhaps even required by 
some banks, of clients turning over voting power at general shareholder meetings to bank 
administrators.
53   
Yet, ironically, U.S. investment banks, particularly J.P. Morgan exercised more 
overt control over American firms than German banks did over their counterparts.  One 
of the largest differences between both countries was the nature of investors that banks 
intermediated and the necessity for direct, activist management during volatile business 
conditions.  In contrast to their German colleagues, American bankers had to seek and 
deal with investors over much wider distances and from foreign lands.  With vast areas 
being opened up by the capital-intensive railroad, American investors found themselves 
very far from the sources of their wealth.  Although the amounts of capital that came 
                                                 
49 Deutsche Bank, Filiale Frankfurt, Geschäfts Bedingungen, HADB. 
50 Jacob Riesser, Das Bankdepotgesetz (Berlin: Otto Liebmann, 1924). 
51  Anmeldung  an  der  am  30  März  1911  General  Versammlung,  Oberschleschische  Kokswerke  & 
Chemische Fabriken AG, Schering AG Archive, BO-311/2. 
52  Bankenquete  1908,  Stenographische  Berichte,  Die  Verhandungen  der  Gesamtkommission  zu  den 
Punkten I-V des Fragebogens (Berlin: Siegfried, 1909) 
53Caroline  Fohlin,  Financial  System  Design  and  Industrial  Development:  International  Patterns  in 
Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), pp. 2-4.  Fohlin, Finance 
Capitalism, pp. 144-167.  Except in well-known cases such as Mannesmann or Phoenix, the paucity of 
examples of active bank management was not a function of a lack of bank leverage with clients but rather 
from the lack economic reasons to devote the time and effort.  Bankers now and then are always doing a 
cost benefit analysis.  The phrase “if it ain’t broke don’t fix it” comes to mind.  Nevertheless, regulators, 
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from Europe, primarily Britain, varied, the powerful New York banking houses had to 
have a foothold with investors in London, Berlin, Paris, and other European centers of 
capital.
54  By 1914, foreigners owned over $7.0 billion in U.S. securities, the majority 
still in railroads but other investments made up approximately 60%. In 1914, America 
played host for more foreign direct investment than all of Western Europe combined.
55   
Given  the  poor  state  of  accounting  information  and  the  dismal,  patchwork  state  of 
America regulations, drawing foreign investors into American securities posed special 
responsibilities.  The private bankers, such as Morgan, Speyer, Belmont, and Kuhn Loeb 
who drew on their mostly European contacts to seek funds, had to give their assurances 
that errant companies would be sorted out and that they would do their utmost to limit the 
damage caused by America’s poor macroeconomic policy making caused by lack of a 
central bank. 
This entailed not only shoring up periodic crises of faith in the value of the dollar 
and the soundness of the banking system in general, but also micromanaging many new 
companies  and  old  ones  that,  especially  during  the  frequent  panics,  lending 
overextensions, restructurings, mergers and acquisitions, or times of excess competition, 
when firms found themselves in financial distress.  To be sure, Germany had a long bout 
of deflation and financial crises but fewer in magnitude than the U.S., which witnessed 
five from 1884 to 1997, and certainly none after 1873 with the kind of market panic, 
severe questions about the banking system, widespread bankruptcies, and volatility that 
seemed all-too commonplace in the U.S.  Many contemporaries and historians noted how 
much German industrial growth was less volatile than in the U.S. or Britain (sometimes 
attributing  it  to  cartels).
56    In  comparison  to  the  "unbelievably  ruthless"  American 
practice  of  "throwing  workers  into  the  streets,"  German  firms  maintained  a  steadier 
                                                 
54  Youssef  Cassis,  Capitals  of  Capital:  A  History  of  International  Financial  Centres,  1780-2005 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 117. 
55 Mira Wilkins, The History of Foreign Investment in the United States to 1914 (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard 
University Press, 1989), pp. 147 and 198.  These figures include portfolio and foreign direct investment 
(FDI).  Geoffrey  Jones,  The  Evolution  of  International  Business:  An  Introduction  (London:  Routledge, 
1996), p. 31. 
56 Alexander J.  Field, "The Relative Stability of German and American Industrial Growth, 1880-1913: A 
Comparative Analysis,” Historische Konjunkturforschung, (Hg.) Wilhelm Heinz Schröder und Reinhard 
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overall employment level.
57  In spite of severe downturns in 1901 and 1907, German steel 
firms overall employment levels did achieve steadier employment figures than American 
steel firms, which frequently laid off over 20% of their workforces, unheard of in German 
firms.
58  
Without  sufficient  holdings  themselves,  without  the  trust  accounts  of  German 
banks with their voting privileges, and limited by regulatory barriers, private American 
banks had to invent elaborate schemes to reassure investors that could keep control.  One 
of J. P. Morgan’s great innovations after company reorganizations was to install a Voting 
Trust agreement, by which the shareholders who benefited from his financial engineering 
had to assign bankers their share voting rights for a period J. P. deemed sufficient to 
insure the future health of the company in question.
59  J. P. employed this device several 
times.  With the Philadelphia and Reading line, for example, Morgan refused to give back 
responsibility for the reorganized company back to its former managers.  He established a 
five-year long Voting Trust, of which he remained chairman, to “guide” management and 
restore  trust  among  American  and  European  investors.    Having  his  son  at  the  helm 
allowed J. P.’s father Junius to convincingly reassure skittish London investors.   Such 
agreements  were  put  into  place  in  situations  that  seemed  to  call  for  active  investor 
management,  but  where  the  shareholders  themselves  could  or  did  not  want  to 
participate.
60  Statistics about interlocking shareholdings and directorships fail to capture 
the importance of these arrangements.  
German banks also derived influence by providing other financial services.  In 
sharp contrast to the United States, German banks led the way in establishing accounting 
and audit firms, which at times held securities and reorganized companies.  Although 
most  of  the  dramatic  changes  occurred  after  World  War  I,  by  1914  American 
                                                 
57 Robert Liefmann, Kartelle und Trusts und die Weiterbildung der volkswirtschaftlichen Organisation 
(Stuttgart 1910), esp.  109-142.  Various editions available. 
58  Compare  the  average  employment  levels  between  1907-1914  in  Feldenkirchen,  Eisen-  und 
Stahlindustrie, Table 104 a/b with Gertrude G. Schroeder, The Growth of Major Steel Companies, 1900-
1950 (Baltimore, 1953), pp. 216-218.  Average yearly employment levels do not take into consideration the 
considerable turnover rates of German unskilled workers. 
59 Kobrak, Banking on Global Markets, Forthcoming. 
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accountancy started to develop along very different lines than its German counterpart.
61 
American  accounting  organizations  worked  very  hard  to  gain  their  independence  in 
defining  accounting  and  auditing  standards.  Central  to  the  formation  of  the  new 
profession was a sense of its independence and monopoly on defining how accounting 
information should be generated and audited.  Although there was still a good deal of 
regional differences, rival organizations, jealousies between big and small firms as well 
as  between  those  with  and  without  foreign  affiliates,  they  labored  against  what  they 
perceived were undue influences from  government agencies, other private individuals 
and  even  foreign,  mostly  English  colleagues.    Although  there  was  never  a  complete 
consensus  before  1914,  American  accountants  chalked  up  many  successes  including 
winning  effective  control  of  licensing,  accounting  education,  and  the  generation  of 
acceptable accounting principles in many important regional jurisdictions such as New 
York.  Fearful of federal and state control, they strove to legitimize their own institutions 
with the authority to adjudicate conflicts.  Despite their profiting greatly from Britain’s 
strong accounting tradition, many American accountants wanted to create an American 
model  of  public  accounting.    For  example,  one  of  the  chief  ethical  concerns  of  the 
nascent profession was eliminating non-accountant ownership and control of accounting 
firms.  By  1929,  banks  were  forbidden  from  performing  audits.    Indeed,  bankers, 
especially those responsible for foreign funds invested in U.S. companies, which by 1900 
had  nearly  tripled  since  the  end  of  the  Civil  War,  were  among  the  most  consistent 
demanders of accounting and audit services.   Even federal efforts to define accounting 
standards in some sectors relied greatly on professional accountants.  In short, although 
divisions remained in the profession, by 1914, accountants had organized themselves into 
relatively  powerful  organizations,  which  shared  a  collective  vision  of  professional 
independence  from  other  organizations  and  a  responsibility  for  defining  professional 
standards.
62  
  The  different  development  and  configuration  of  German  accountancy  is  quite 
striking.  In the last decade of the 19
th century, all the major German banks were offering 
                                                 
61 Fear and Kobrak, “Diverging Paths.”  Stephen E. Loeb and Paul J. Miranti, Jr., The Institute of Accounts: 
Nineteenth-Century  Origins  of  Accounting  Professionalism  in  the  United  States  (London:  Routledge, 
2004). 
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auditing  and  reorganization  services  through  separate  subsidiaries,  which  often 
maintained offices at the banks branches.  These controlled firms took a leading part in 
molding German accounting and also in the  management of troubled firms.
63 During 
most of the period under discussion, German accountants were divided among firms that 
were closely tied to other institutions and small independent firms that were not.  In much 
the same way as American accounting and auditing in the last quarter of the 20
th century 
became tied to other activities and institutions such as consulting, which reduced their 
independence,  much  of  the  German  profession  had  little  independent  status,  in  part 
because it was controlled by institutions with other activities and interests.
64  Deutsche 
Bank, for example, ran its own audit firm as a subsidiary with offices in its branches.  
Originally formed as an American investment trust, in the early 1890s, after a series of 
American financial crises, the founder reconstituted the firm to audit all companies and to 
deal with firms in financial distress.  The Deutsche Treuhand Gesellschaft (DTG), as it 
eventually  was  called,  solidified  Deutsche  Bank’s  role  with  clients  as  their  principal 
provider  of financial  services  and  as  a  general  business  consultant.    For  the  bank,  it 
seemed to be a natural extension of its fiduciary responsibilities with clients and even a 
part of bankers’ duties as members of Aufsichtsräte.
65  By 1900, banks owned the most 
powerful  auditing  firms  in  Germany  and  they  were  not  run  by  publicly  chartered 
accountants.  Not all the impetus for entrusting banks with many corporate governance 
functions derived from German political or economic reasons. One of Germany’s first 
bad  experiences  with  American  foreign  investments  thrust  the  banking  sector  into 
providing  audit  and  bankruptcy  services,  first  for  foreign  investments,  then  later  for 
domestic ones.
66  Well before the 1930s, a good deal of these activities had begun to fall 
into the hands of other specialized institutions in the United States, such as specialized 
                                                 
63  See  Fear  and  Kobrak,,  “Building  Solidity,”  and  See  Reiner  Quick,  “The  Formation  and  Early 
Development of German Audit Firms,” Accounting, Business & Financial History, Vol. 15, No. 3, 317-
343, for an excellent discussion of the early history of German auditing.  The distinction between inside 
(private) and outside auditing so prevalent by the 1990s also began prior to 1914, see Christian Leuz and 
Jens Wüstemann, “The Role of Accounting in the German Financial System,” The German Financial 
System, (eds.) Jan P. Krahnen and Reinhard H. Schmidt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 450-
481. 
64 For a discussion of the problems for accounting firms caused by consulting see Christopher McKenna, 
The World Newest Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)  
65 Kobrak, Banking on Global Markets, and Fear and Kobrak, “Building Solidity,” 
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accounting firms or consultants,
67 and private banks or other institutions, whose power 
rested from a different set of competitive strengths and whose activities were, because of 
their very private nature, even more scrutinized and attacked by the public, even though 
they had little to do with share ownership or board membership.  
The profitability of large public and powerful private banks was the subject of 
heated debate in Germany, but nothing on the scale of Morgan’s money generation, in 
part because the opportunities were not there. Morgan’s pricing of issues and apparent 
gains seemed to many an abuse of financial power to the detriment of the public good. 
Only the gravity of American crises and the degree of information asymmetries could 
account for his power and profits. For example, within twelve years, Morgan spearheaded 
three efforts to save the American currency and banking system; he earned large financial 
rewards and public outrage each time.  By some accounts, the Morgan syndicate earned 
$6-7 million in 22 minutes with the 1895 Gold Bond alone to the chorus of denunciations 
in Congress.
68 Like most U.S. private bankers, Morgan’s success in this in many other 
transactions depended on his ability to forge tight relationships with European bankers, 
especially British and German banks.
69   
The transportation sectors best illustrates how America’s hunger for capital, high 
returns, and financial fragility all combined to expand the role of banks.  The differences 
between  Germany  and  the  United  States  are  striking.    Whereas  the  sector  called  for 
maximum bank intervention in the U.S., by 1900, virtually all German lines had been 
nationalized.  Banks had not only earned huge commission for aiding the State buy up 
private lines during the last 20 years of the century, they and their clients had to look 
elsewhere for large transportation investments, which helped make German investors one 
of the leading groups active on U.S. capital markets and as agents for listing American 
securities on German markets.  
                                                 
67 McKenna, pp. 16-17. 
68 Ron Chernow, The House of Morgan: An American Banking Dynasty and the Rise of Modern Finance 
(New York: Touchtone, 1990), p. 76.  With each of these undertakings, Morgan earned less money and 
more public acrimony.   
69  See  Claudia  Langen,  Tradition,  Expansion  und  Kooperation:  Deutsch-Amerikanische 
Bankenbeziehungen von 1900 bis 1917, (Cologne Disseration, 1995) and Christopher Kobrak., “The Rise 
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The importance to capital markets of railroad and their frequent financial distress 
created  opportunities  for  bank  involvement  in  companies  that  was  unmatched  in 
Germany.  In the early 1870s, railroad failures had a great impact on German capital 
markets and the German psyche, but Bismarck’s nationalization of most of the railroads 
was  nearly  completed  by  the  time  he  left  office,  providing  a  series  of  transaction 
windfalls  for  some  banks,  but  effectively  removing  financial  institutions  from  rail 
management  and  the  stock  market  in  Germany.
70  Around  the  same  time,  railroads 
accounted for approximately 35% of American equity markets, 180,000 miles of track, 
nearly seven times the amount in Germany.  By 1893, however, 74 rail companies were 
in receivership, with $1.8 billion in capital and 30,000 miles of track.
71  Moreover, by the 
early 1890s, roughly a third of U.S. railroad securities were in the hands of foreigners.
72 
As  one  of  the  chief  conduits  of  European  and  American  money  into  the  fast 
growing and often troubled railroad sector, Morgan and his men gave financial advice, 
hired  and  fired  managers,  engineered  or  defended  against  takeover  attempts,  and 
monitored  investment  to  prevent  “ruinous”  competition  for  dozens  of  lines.    He  was 
reported  to  have said  to  one  stubborn  rail man,  “your  roads  belong  to  my  clients.”
73  
Except perhaps for the Mannesmann brothers, booted out by the Deutsche Bank, and the 
deep disappointment of Phoenix managers whose banks did not back their refusal to join 
the Steel Works Association because their housebanks were afraid of August Thyssen, 
we cannot think of an example of a German industrialist writing a book railing against 
their  bankers  entitled  Cannibals  of  Finance:  Fifteen  Years’  Contest  with  the  Money 
Trust.
74 
                                                 
70 Fritz Stern, Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichröder, and the Building of the German Empire (New York: 
Alred A. Knopf, 1977)  
71 Karl Helfferich, Georg von Siemens: Ein Lebensbild aus Deutschlands groβer Zeit (Berlin: Verlag von 
Julius Springer, 1923), Vol. 2, pp. 223 and 253-254.  Helfferich’s biography of the first head of Deutsche 
Bank contains a lot of interesting information about the American rail sector.  The weight he gives it serves 
as testimony for the importance of this sector to Deutsche Bank’s history. 
72 Mira Wilkins, The History of Foreign Investment in the United States to 1914 (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard 
University Press, 1989) pp. 197-198. 
73 Quoted in Jean Strouse, Morgan: American Financier (New York: HarperCollins, 1988), p. 196.  For a 
detailed  discussion  of  how  Morgan  and  Deutsche  Bank  actively  managed  the  affairs  of  the  Northern 
Pacific, see Christopher Kobrak, Men, Markets, Cooperation and Conflict, forthcoming. 
74 Arthur Edward Stillwell (Builder of the Kansas City Southern Railroad, The Kansas City, Mexico and 
Orient Railroad, The Port Arthur Channel and Dock), Cannibals of Finance: Fifteen Years’ Contest with 
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Like  his  German  counterparts,  Morgan  also  helped  create  new  commercial 
enterprises.  As in Germany, this tended to increase the scope of active management in 
Germany.  But American markets provided an additional opportunity for active bank 
management that was less prevalent in Germany: mergers.  Both Germany and the U.S. 
witnessed a bounce in merger activity at the very end of the 19
th century, but the number 
of companies lost to mergers in the U.S. was 100 times higher than in Germany.
75  With 
mostly  bank  encouragement,  German  companies  tended  to  mitigate  the  effects  of 
competition  and  achieve  some  benefits  of  scale  more  by  use  of  cartels,  rather  than 
outright mergers.  Indeed cartels were designed to slow merger activity that might lead to 
American-style trustification.  The cartelization of business left room for many banking 
services,  but  reduced the  need  for  active  bank  management  in complicated  corporate 
restructurings  or  with  bankruptcies,  which  ironically  promoted  many  financial 
innovations.
76  Moreover, with more founding families remaining in German businesses, 
the need for an external institution to adjudicate conflicts was reduced. 
In short, with all these sources of cumulating power, it is no wonder that the 
general population and regulators worried about Morgan’s influence. Because business 
and  communication  was  so  transnational  during  the  first  wave  of  globalization—
symbolized by the brother Warburgs—we have a good deal of information from the other 
side of the Atlantic about the specific roles and interests of banks on boards in the U.S. 
and Germany before World War I.  Even Morgan’s German banking colleagues in an era 
of stupendous combinations and in spite of his many  great successes, were aghast at 
times. At least one German colleague, who had worked closely with Morgan, confided 
his fears of Morgan megalomania to his representative in New York.  
You will have heard possibly of the latest German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, 
who died in a lunatic asylum last year and in my judgment was crazy all his life.  In 
one of his much read and much quoted books he puts forward, as a consummation 
to be wished the development of man into the ‘Uebermensch,’ ignoring good and 
bad.  Mr. Morgan seems to be well on his way towards Nietzsche’s ideal.
77 
                                                 
75  C.  J.  Schmitz,  The  growth  of  big  business  in  the  United  States  and  western  Europe,  1850-1939 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 40. 
76  Peter  Tufano,  “Business  Failure, Judicial  Intervention,  and  Financial Innovation:  Restructuring  U.S. 
Railroads in the Nineteenth Century,” Business History Review, Vol. 71, 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 1-40.  Fear, 
Organizing Control, pp. xx-xx. 





































8  34 
 
What better indication of the different regulatory and political perceptions of bankers in 
the two countries than the dramatic contrast between their being ennobled and elected to 
the Reichstag in Germany  (Georg Siemens of Deutsche Bank), and J. P. Morgan being 
hauled up in front of Congressional commissions (Pujo Hearings) in the U.S. for financial 
conspiracy against the public. 
Consider more specifically the contrast between the activities of the Deutsche 
Bank and J. P. Morgan.  Founded in 1870, just before the great boom and bust of the 
early 1870s, Deutsche Bank’s merger with several German banks greatly increased its 
customer base and customer contacts, positioning it to become Germany’s largest bank, 
as  measured  by  assets,  by the  end  of the  century.
78   Deutsche  Bank  cultivated  close 
corporate  and  individual  clients  at  first  using  communities  of  interest 
(Interessengemeinschaften) with independent banks and later built a large network of its 
own branches.  Nevertheless, it could hardly be said to have dominated the management 
of its closest corporate clients. At Krupp, for which Deutsche Bank had launched the 
bank’s first public bond issue (1879), and at Siemens & Halske, which Deutsche took 
public in 1896 and with whom the bank enjoyed a strong familial bond, the bank still did 
not hold sway over  management matters.  Krupp was so embarassed by its financial 
distress in the 1870s that its business policy was never to permit banks again to have such 
leverage. Hugo Stinnes, who regularly worked with a lot of debt and had nothing to 
complain  about  regarding  his  banking  relations,  still  thought  that  it  was  somehow 
“unworthy” to be so dependent on bank credit.
79  Carl Klönne and Oscar Schlitter, both 
of the Deutsche Bank and some of the most powerful men in the Ruhr, were often simply 
baffled and surprised by Thyssen—and Klönne was a close personal friend.  Deutsche 
Bank acted as a trusted advisor – as a sort of outsourced financial staff – whose primary 
business interest was selling services.  Most of its income came from pedestrian banking 
services such as interest charged and processing bills of exchange rather than commission 
payments related to floating securities and other more sophisticated services.  Even with 
                                                 
78 Lothar Gall, “The Deutsche Bank from its Founding to the Great War 1870-1914,” in Lothar Gall, et al., 
The Deutsche Bank: 1870-1995 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1995, p. 21. 
79 Hugo Stinnes to August Thyssen 26 March 1908, quoted in Manfred Rasch und Gerald D. Feldman 
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its managers serving as members of corporate clients’ Aufsichtsräte or where the bank 
was clearly considered the company’s Hausbank, Deutsche Bank managers seemed to 
have  little  involvement  in  the  day-to-day  management  of  companies  such  as  Krupp, 
BASF, and Siemens & Halske, for which they provided varied financial services.  Indeed, 
for much of the period under discussion that kind of activity was expressly forbidden to 
Aufsichtsrat members. Only when established companies—such as AEG in the 1880s and 
Mannesmann  in  the  1890s—ran  into  severe  financial  difficulty  did  bankers  begin  to 
actively  manage  companies,  and  then  often  through  intermediaries.
80  But  the  greater 
stability of the German economy, the ‘liquidity guarantee’ of a existing Central Bank, 
and the greater clarity of its creditor-friendly bankruptcy law made such interventions 
rarer and of shorter duration.  Like their American counterparts, they sometimes did serve 
as venture capitalists.  With the start-up companies they helped to establish – such as, in 
the  construction  of  the  Baghdad  railway,  the  creation  of  Deutsche  Petroleum 
Aktiengesellschaft, or Mannesmann, then Deutsche Bank managers had a more detailed 
involvement in business decisions.
81    
We are not arguing that bankers did not play a very important role in the German 
economy, but the relationship with firms was symbiotic, more advisory, consultative, and 
more or less partner-like than directive, let alone more “universal” in the services they 
offered.  Till  this  day,  although  German  Mittelstand  firms  have  extremely  low  equity 
ratios  and  are  deeply  dependent  on  bank  credit,  German  banks  are  not  expected  to 
interfere in their activities except when asked as advisors or during distress.  Like their 
larger counterparts, medium-sized Mittelstand firms tended to work with multiple bank 
relationships to activate competition, which led to the use of banking pools if workouts 
were needed.
82  Banks’ connection to capital markets, as a conduit of funds from those 
with excess funds to those who needed financing including funneling investments from 
Germany abroad, rather than as active managers of companies.  In fact, the Deutsche 
Bank probably had as much or more experience with active management of companies 
                                                 
80  
81 Gall, pp. 30-77.  Fear, Organizing Control. 
82 Hartmut Berghoff, “The End of Family Business: The Mittelstand and German Capitalism in Transition, 
1949-2000,” Business History Review, 80/2 (Summer 2006), pp. xx-xx.  Elsas and Krahnen, “Universal 
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outside of Germany than inside it.
83 In contrast to their American counterparts, they were 
encouraged by legislation, regulation, and informal norms to serve this capital market 
role  by  taking  responsibility  for  the  securities  they  issued  and  recommended;  when 
problems arose, they needed to intervene to ameliorate them (see Riesser quote above).  
They should serve ‘productive’ capital, rather than ‘speculate.’  In fact it was common at 
the  time  to  distinguish  between  “deposit  banks”  (commercial-retail  banking)  and 
“speculation  banks”  (investment  banks).
84  Although  several  governmental  inquiries 
investigated the roles of banks in German society, eligible voters and regulators by and 
large  accepted  their  social  utility  as  long  as  they  did  not  “speculate”  with  healthy, 
productive companies.
85  Holding large shareholding was deemed an emission failure, 
problems in the company, or viewed with suspicion.  Finally, in part as a public relations 
stance  and  in  part  because  of  the  tighter  world  of  German  national,  regional,  and 
municipal  banking,  German  bankers  were  more  “socialized”  than  U.S.  investment 
bankers on Wall Street known for their rapaciousness even amongst their clients. 
By  contrast,  in  many  sectors  America  took  longer  to  get  its  “regulatory  act 
together,” which meant that banks in the U.S., including the Deutsche Bank, not only had 
to perform some functions that were certainly not unknown to the Europeans, but they 
also had to perform them more often, a fact that contributed to banks being considered a 
part of the problem, rather than its solution. The Deutsche Bank, for example, may have 
had its most intense experience “controlling companies” in the U.S.  Deutsche Bank’s 
own managers and representatives were active in the restructuring of several American 
companies.    Deutsche  Bank  managers  and  their  representatives  helped  engineer  the 
reorganization of at least one major U.S. railroad, oversaw with tight control the first five 
years of that restructured railroads’ life, restructured the forerunner of General Electric, 
as well as creating a coking joint-venture.  Its “management team” served in some cases 
as the president of the companies or chaired boards of directors.  Under American law, 
the president of the board of directors was not prohibited from involvement in day-to-day 
                                                 
83 Kobrak, Banking on Global Markets.. 
84 Weber, Depositenbanken und Spekulationsbanken. 
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management—unlike the German two-tiered board.
86  No German bank was as active as 
J.  P.  Morgan  in  restructuring  whole  industries,  creating  massive  mergers,  or  simply 
taking over distressed firms and reorganizing them.  
Finally,  we  need  to  contextualize  the  great  Berlin  banks  within  the  German 
banking system as a whole. Their dominance in the financing of business was highly 
concentrated in heavy industries such as mining and metal production, not in the more 
cash-rich sectors such as chemicals and electrical industries.  Most importantly, before 
the  1960s  the  large  private  commercial  banks  completely  neglected  the  massive 
Mittelstand, still the backbone of the German economy. The large German banks were 
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86 Christopher Kobrak, Men, Markets, Cooperation and Conflict: Deutsche Bank and the United States, 
1870 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). 
87 Richard Deeg, Finance Capitalism Unveiled: Banks and the German Political Economy (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1999).  Deeg discusses mostly the post-1945 period, but the patterns began 
much earlier.  See also Timothy Guinnane, “Delegated Monitors.”  On the development of the savings 
banks  and  its  credit  operations,  see  Günter  Ashauer,  Von  der  Ersparungscasse  zur  Sparkassen-
Finanzgruppe: Die deutsche Sparkassenorganisation in Geschichte und Gegenwart (Stuttgart: Deutscher 
Sparkassenverlag, 1991).  Jürgen Mura, Entwicklungslinien der deutchen Sparkassengeschichte (Stuttgart: 
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The famous Berlin banks controlled just 10% of total banking assets in Germany in 1913 
and  just  about  14-15%  today.  Private  commercial  banks  (including  private  bankers) 
controlled about 28% of total assets in 1913 (29% today) versus 63% in 1900 and 1922 
and 27% in the U.S in 1990.
88 Not until the early 1920s after a wave of consolidations did 
Berlin  banks  begin  to  swallow  up  other  provincial  commercial  banks.  But  most 
importantly a strong, socially-oriented savings bank sector was the largest single sector.  
Mortgage banks and other such specialized lending institutes were also larger in terms of 
banking  assets.    In  short,  in  1913  as  today,  Germany  remained  a  highly  fragmented 
banking system built along the “three-pillar” model of private commercial, savings, and 
cooperative banks—a highly class-stratified banking model.     
Nevertheless, in some respects, the German banking system was concentrated and 
coordinated.
89  The Interessengemeinschaften and participations in local banks offset, to a 
large extent, the need for as large a network like their English competitors.  The state 
itself limited the growth of large bank networks by operating its own offices.
90  Some 
regional and local banks were even owned and run by state and local governments.  As in 
America,  the  number  of  local  banks  mushroomed.    In  Prussia  alone,  there  was  an 
enormous increase in small local savings banks (Sparkassen).  From 1839 through 1913, 
their number grew from 85 to 1765.  In 1913, there were 3113 Sparkassen with assets of 
20,547 million Marks.
91  In 1913, Sparkassen had over double the assets of the large 
banks (9).  Provincial banks in total (151) had roughly the same level of assets as the nine 
large banks, whose share of the total assets was less than 14 percent.
92  
                                                 
88 White, “Were Banks Special Intermediaries,” p. 14. 
89 Manfred Pohl, Entstehung und Entwicklung des Universalbankensystems: Konzentration und Krise als 
wichtige Faktoren (Frankfurt/Main: Fritz Knapp Verlag, 1986)., 200-202.  The concentration of German 
banking took many forms during this period, but the form of German regulation hindered, however, other 
forms of concentration.  From 1870 through 1913, the large banks acquired 504 banking companies, 367 of 
those acquisitions occurring between 1901 and 1913.  As early as 1880, independent banks were organized 
into Interessengemeinschaften (Communities of Interest), permitted by regulatory authorities to “coordinate 
business in a communal fashion” for pooling business and dividing profits.  The concentration of banking 
gave the large German banks greater economies of scale and enormous market power with their clients, but 
their branch networks were nowhere near as large as those in England, because of high registration and 
administrative costs for branches 
90  The  Reichsbank  also  operated  487  branches  throughout  Germany,  which  provided  various  banking 
services.  Pohl, 203. 
91 Pohl, Enstehung und Entwicklung des Universalbankensystems, 272. 
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Although the German banking system was sufficiently fragmented to produce the 
same kind of political conflicts that Mark Roe believed helped explain the severe limits 
placed  on  banking  in  the  U.S.  during  the  first  half  of  the  20
th  century  as  well  as 
potentially causing a dispersed shareholder structure like America, regional and money-
center  banks  in  Germany  seemed  less  threatening  to  one  another  than  in  the  U.S.
93  
Certainly the degree to which the smaller banks held assets is not a good indication of the 
relative power of the banks within the financial sector or with clients, especially the 
public companies.  The German financial system is best characterized as cooperative, 
with certain kinds of divisions of labor.  Whereas the regional banks maintained a closer 
relationship to Mittelstand companies, where the division of management and ownership 
was less pronounced, the bigger banks specialized in the services of more interest to large 
public companies that were largely self-financing especially after 1895.  As discussed, 
the smaller banks had to work through the large, money-center banks for many matters, 
including depositing their shares and those of their customers with the money-centered 
banks, a practice that contributed to the big banks’ leverage with their own clients.    
 
1.2  Review of the Regulatory Debates: Transparency versus Responsibility  
The debate over the proper role of banks in the economy is long-standing and 
international.    In  both  countries,  discussions  about  the  proper  role  of  banks  in  the 
economy heated up in the last decade of the 19
th century, contributing to their respective 
evolutionary  institutional paths.    Scholars,  bankers, and journalists  recognize  that the 
conceptual foundation for how banks and stock markets might contribute to a stable, just, 
and effective economy needed thorough examination.   
In the United States, in great contrast to Germany, limiting the power of large 
banks haunted the Progressives.  Those eager for reform were torn between their desire to 
avoid centralization of power and the necessity to control private interests eager to step 
into the financial and regulatory void.  Even stalwart business leaders wanted to see some 
alternative to the great private banks authority over the banking system and the economy 
as a whole. They had no trouble recommending stripping private banks, like J.P. Morgan, 
of their quasi-public role. Morgan provided credit to banks, the government, saved the 
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Gold Standard, and practically substituted for a central bank, as almost all other major 
national economies had.  Many railed at the concentration of pure financing power in 
private banks like Morgans and Kuhn Loeb.  As Louis Brandeis, the most famous leader 
of the reform movement wrote in his extremely popular book, Other People’s Money and 
How the Bankers Use It, about the concentration of financial power in the United States: 
But  the  compelling  reason  for  prohibiting  interlocking  directorates  is 
neither  the  protection  of  stockholders,  nor  the  protection  of  the  public 
from  the  incidents  of  inefficiency  and  graft.  Conclusive  evidence  (if 
obtainable)  that  the  practice  of  interlocking  directorates  benefited  all 
stockholders and was the most efficient form of organization, would not 
remove  the  objections.  For  even  more  important  than  efficiency  are 
industrial  and  political  liberty;  and  these  are  imperiled  by  the  Money 
Trust.  Interlocking  directorates  must  be  prohibited,  because  it  is 
impossible to break the Money Trust without putting an end to the practice 
in the larger corporations.
94   
 
 
While Brandeis’s views may not have been mainstream in 1900, the White House 
and American legislature were controlled for most of the next 20 years by politicians and 
parties that favored significant reform of the banking system that would further strip 
powers  away  from  bankers.
95  Moreover,  although  the  testimony  of  the  president  of 
Continental  and  Chicago  National  Bank  at  the  Pujo  Commission  hearings  (see  lead 
quote)  may  not  have  represented  the  majority  of  bankers’  opinions,  it  does  point  to 
certain  conflict  among  large  bankers  or  at  least  some  resignation  about  the  political 
limitations of bankers.  Unlike Germany, in the United States, bankers outside of New 
York not only resented the power of private investment banks and larger public banks, 
they had long before succeeded in removing them as competitors in some fields and 
hoped for even more successes before 1914.   
Ardent reformers had no difficulty finding political allies from business segments 
threatened by big, money-center banks (see lead quote).  As Mark Roe argued nearly 100 
                                                 
94 Louis D. Brandeis, Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use It, edited with an introduction by 
Melvin I. Urofsky (Boston: Bedford Books of St. Martin’s Press, [1913] 1995), p. 76.  
95 In the pro-reform group, we have put Roosevelt and Wilson, among Presidents.   Collectively, they 
account for 15 of the 20 years.  The legislative branch is somewhat more difficult to assess, but clearly anti-
status  quo  sentiments  were  prevalent  in  both  the  House  and  the  Senate,  which  finally  led  to  some 
significant reforms, including the Federal Reserve Act.  For the degree of anti-bank sentiment prevalent 
before 1900, see Richard Franklin Bensel, The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 1877-
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years later, “American corporate structures are in considerable part the result of political 
decisions,  many  long  forgotten,  about  the  organization  of  financial  intermediaries.”
96 
Such political decisions were a product of particularly American circumstances, which 
included:  American  populist  ideology  that  emphasized  the  dangers  of  large  powerful 
economic and political institutions; interest group politics, which allowed small financial 
institutions, small businesses, and managers to effectively resist financial concentration, 
and, finally, federalism, which gave local and regional interests a loud voice. For Roe, the 
fact  that  non-American  systems  dealt  differently  with  the  technologically-driven 
economic necessity faced by all modern firms to achieve greater economies of scale and 
scope proves that America’s model of distant shareholders and centralized management 
was  determined  by  the  particularities  of  American  political  history.    While  Roe 
recognizes here and in other places that the choice of corporate governance system had a 
profound  relationship  to  a  country’s  entire  social  system  –  a  fact  not  lost  on 
contemporaries in Germany and the U.S. – he de-emphasizes the broader attitudinal and 
historical differences between the two nations, which account for the different directions 
their banking and corporate governance systems took before and after World War I.
97   
The potential opposition of small private banks, other financial institutions such 
as savings banks or cooperatives (largely because they operated in separate spheres), or 
their clients had no comparable success in Germany before World War I.  The powerful 
Marxist-influenced Social Democratic left had the strongest anti-big bank rhetoric, but 
that was the problem, they were socialist; on top of this the concentration in German 
banking was for them the natural evolution of capitalism.  Opposition to large money-
centered banks never coalesced into a political force in Germany, in large part because 
resentment never attained the strength and breadth of feeling there that it witnessed in the 
U.S.    According  to  one  contemporary  British  banking  expert:  “Considering  the 
                                                 
96 Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), Preface.  
Idem, “Political Preconditions of Separating Ownership from Corporate Control,” Stanford Law Review, 
Volume 53, Number 3, December 2000; “Rents and Their Corporate Consequences,” Stanford Law Review, 
Volume  53,  Number  6,  July  2001;  “The  Shareholder  Wealth  Maximization  Norm  and  Industrial 
Organization,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Volume 149, Number 6, June 2001; Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk  and  Mark  Roe.    “A  Theory  of  Path  Dependence  in  Corporate  Ownership  and  Governance, 
Stanford Law Review, Volume 52, Number 1, November 1999.  We wish to convey my thanks to Martin 
Müller of the Deutsche Bank Archiv and Michael Allen of Georgia Tech, and Mark Roe for their assistance 
97 Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners, p. 213.  For a larger discussion of the attitudinal differences and 
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recognised activities of the German banks, the public at large does not find anything 
disquieting or unsafe in the manner in which they employ the funds entrusted to them.  Its 
mentality is a different one.  Confidence in the administration of the banks, and in the 
integrity and responsibilities of the Boards of Directors, which are mostly composed of 
capable and influential men, and in the ability of the management, has in the course of 
years  been  so  much  strengthened  that  only  a  serious  catastrophe  could  shake  it.”
98  
Although  some  German  businessmen,  especially  the  founding  fathers  of  Second 
Industrial  Revolution  companies,  were  suspicious  of  bankers’  motives,  even  those 
mostly-family businesses maintained cordial relations with bankers and respected their 
general  role  in  the  German  economy.  The  relationship  between  Deutsche  Bank  and 
Germany’s two  electrical  giants, Siemens and AEG, hardly fit into either extreme of 
complete dependence or conflict.  For family and other reasons, the bank maintained a 
special  relationship  to  both  companies  and  played  an  active  role  in  their  financial 
planning for most of the period under discussion. 
We also cannot think of a comparable tract written by a major corporate executive 
for Germany until World War I such as Cannibals of Finance: Fifteen Years’ Contest 
with the Money Trust. Arthur Stilwell, a promoter who built over one thousand miles of 
the Kansas City, Mexico and Orient Railroad, the Kansas City Southern Railroad, and 
Port Arthur Channel and Dock, the Liberty Bell mining Company of Colorado, among 
other ventures, wrote this book calling the President to “once and for all end the injustice 
of the Money Trust, and no longer allow the Comptroller’s office to be a tool whereby 
Wall Street may call the loans of any man they wish to ruin.” Stilwell complained that if 
his businesses had been blown up by dynamite, he would have at least had recourse to the 
law, but instead it was “destroyed by a combination of rich men:” The greatest power in 
America today is the money god.  He rules the Government; he rules the factory; he rules 
the railroad, the farm, the home.  The center of Government of the United States is not in 
Washington.  It is in Wall Street!”
99 With friends, clients, and fellow businessmen such 
                                                 
98 Leopold Joseph, The Evolution of German Banking (London: Charles & Edwin Layton, 1914), p. 112. 
99 Arthur Edward Stilwell, Cannibals of Finance: Fifteen Years’ Contest with the Money Trust (Chicago: 
Farnum Publishing Co. 1912), quotes from p. 14-15, 35. We also cannot think of a comparable quote: “Not 
only were most of [Mellon’s] enterprises wholly integrated operations but his interests as a whole were 
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as these and Mr. Reynolds of the Chicago National Bank at the Pujo hearings (see lead 
quote), who needed enemies.  Even American private bankers recognized the need for 
significant reform of the American banking system and, in 1911, actively participated in 
a doomed Senate plan for the reformation of many aspects of American finance.
100 
Two of the most important Progressive debates during the first decades of the 20
th 
century involved reducing banker control of corporations and general coordination of 
money and banking.  Even before World War I, Progressives not only enjoyed electoral 
successes, but also regulatory ones, too, not the least of which was the legislation leading 
to the Federal Reserve.  Indeed without a central bank, coordination of the money supply 
had largely been left in private hands.  The Platform of the Progressive Party in 1912, 
then led by Teddy Roosevelt, recognized that concentration in business was an economic 
and  national  necessity,  but  called  for  tighter  federal  control  and  transparency,  an 
anathema  to  the  special  relationship  between  bankers  and  corporations,  as  the  best 
antidote to placing economic power “in the hands of few.”
101  According to Roosevelt 
and others, the affairs of corporations needed the widest spread publicity:  “In the interest 
of the public, government should have the right to inspect and examine the workings of 
the  great  corporations  engaged  in  interstate  business.”
102  The  great  industrial 
concentrations  and  money  trust  appeared  to  call  into  question  American  federalism 
(division of power) and democracy.   
Ten years later, for many reformers, despite Washington’s trust busting zeal, what 
still stood in government’s way for creating more transparency was the Money Trust, the 
concentration of financial power led by J. P. Morgan & Co., the two largest national 
banks in New York, and several other private banks.  Together, they and their controlled 
                                                                                                                                                 
Mellon companies.  Alcoa’s laborers lived in houses financed by Union Trust, built on Mellon lots out of 
Mellon lumber, heated by Mellon coal, lit by Mellon utilities, and they rode to work on Mellon streetcars.  
If they had any money left at the end of the week, it went into a Mellon bank.”  Perhaps Krupp or Thyssen, 
but not a bank. Quoted in David Koskoff, The Mellons: The Chronicle of America’s Richest Family (New 
York: Crowell,1978), p. 125 
100 Citibank, p. 60-61.  Morgan, Benjamin Strong, of Bankers Trust, and Paul M. Warburg of Kuhn Loeb 
were among the bankers who assisted Senator Nelson Aldrich, a Republican from Rhode Island. With the 
Democratic victory in the 1910 Congressional elections, the plan, which included a Central Bank modelled 
after the Bank of England, had little chance of passage. 
101 “Progressive Party Platform of 1912,” in The Progressive Movement 1900-1915, Richard Hofstadter, ed. 
and intro. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1963), p. 128.  
102 “Roosevelt’s First Annual Message to Congress,” in The Progressive Movement 1900-1915, Richard 
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Trust companies, such as Bankers and Guaranty, used their own resources, and perhaps 
more importantly, the resources of others that they administered, to control 34 banks, 10 
insurance companies, and 32 transportation companies with total assets of over $20.0 
billion, an amount roughly equivalent to Germany’s Gross National Product that year.
103  
The House Majority Report on the Pujo Committee’s Investigation, in contrast to that of 
the  Senate,  chastised  the  investment  banking  community’s  concentration  of  power, 
especially  the  degree  to  which  the  dominated  the  economy  by  sitting  on  so  many 
corporate boards and led credence to incoming President Wilson’s efforts to reform the 
entire banking system.  That report also became the basis of Brandeis’s famous book, a 
work not by a “mere political radical” but rather a close advisor to Wilson and later a 
Supreme Court Justice. 
Nonetheless, there were some striking parallels in the timing and overall structure 
of  the  debates—but  increasingly  not  with  the  interpretation  of  problems  and,  most 
importantly, their solutions.
104 To summarize briefly, German traumatic experiences with 
capital market instability especially after “founders crisis” of 1873 reinforced already-
existing  suspicious  attitudes  against  laissez  faire  liberal  capitalism  (Manchestertum), 
joint-stock companies, and speculation, leading to calls for a system in which stability, 
reputation, and respectability became a paramount virtue—classic bürgerlich (bourgeois) 
values. Germans tended to think unfettered markets were a source of disorder, not the 
equilibriating order of Adam Smith. Cartels allegedly created a form of industrial branch 
management but also prevented American-style trustification and union-busting.  Family 
or  personal  ownership  control  was  encouraged.    Insider  governance  by  people  or 
institutions with an ownership ‘stake’ in the company was implicitly held to be a virtue, 
not a vice.  Distant shareholders (speculators or Gründer (founders or promoters)) were 
viewed  as  footloose,  potential  parasites  draining  healthy  businesses  of  necessary 
investment capital. (Hearing echoes of today’s fear of “locusts” devouring good, solid 
German companies is more than warranted.)  We must remember that the separation of 
                                                 
103  “The  Pujo  Committee  on  the  Money  Trust,”  in  The  Progressive  Movement  1900-1915,  Richard 
Hofstadter, ed. and intro. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1963), p. 158-160. 
104 We spend much more time on the historical-cultural approach to identifying such attitudes, assumptions, 
or preferences in Fear and Kobrak, “Sonderwegs,” forthcoming.  See Fear and Kobrak, “Origins of German 
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ownership and control was one of the most worrying issues of modern corporate life also 
in the U.S.; Germans ‘solved’ it by wanting to keep families or owner-entrepreneurs 
involved.    Large  banks  and  bankers  profiled  themselves  as  responsible  “trustees”  or 
“stewards” for investors as well as comported themselves as pillars of social cohesion, 
bourgeois respectability, and as instruments of national economic interest.
105 Interlocking 
directories certainly were a form of concentration, but those links proved that banks were 
dedicated to those productive enterprises rather than treating them as commodities on the 
stock  market.    This  comportment,  too,  was  also  a  result  of  anti-big  bank,  and  anti-
speculative behavior that all-to-often shaded into anti-Semitism. Accounting regulations 
encouraged  building  reserves  to  smooth  earnings  and  dividend  payments  (allegedly 
stabilizing  the  volatility  of  capitalism)  and  enhancing  the  solidity  (Substanz)  of  the 
firm—not an accounting trick to fleece shareholders from their rightful money.  While 
not mutually exclusive, Americans tended to demand transparency and deconcentration 
of power, while Germans demanded dedication, solidity, and responsibility. 
In Germany, as regards banks, mainstream criticism revolved around harnessing 
banking power for the public good—not destroying bank power.  Indeed, in 1901, Jacob 
Riesser,  head  of  the  influential  Central  Association  of  German  Banks  and  Bankers 
(Centralverband des deutschen Bank- und Bankiergewerbes, today the Association of 
German Banks), founded it to help counter such anti-big-bank sentiment.  Riesser and 
this association attempted to reform the more odious regulations, such as the 1896 Stamp 
Act, but also engaged in public relations to legitimize the role of large banks in corporate 
governance.  Among such differing groups of German bankers, moreover, considerable 
conflict and competition arose among the cooperatives (split into two rivals), savings 
banks (highly federalist or local), and private commercial banks that also became divided 
among  provincial  banks,  private  equity  banks,  and  the  great  Berlin  universal  banks.  
Federalism too played a large role in Germany, but in a way that bolstered a powerful 
savings  bank  system  built  along  federalist  lines.  One  German  solution  to  the 
                                                 
105 See Riesser, Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der deutschen Grossbanken,” pp. 304-306.  Morten Reitmayer, 
Bankiers im Kaiserreich: Sozialprofil und Habitus der deutschen Hochfinanz (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1999).  Hartmut Berghoff and Ingo Köhler, „Redesigning a Class of its Own: Social and Human 
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concentration of banking power among private commercial banks as they stretched their 
bank networks into the provinces, was to permit the savings bank system to become more 
“bank-like” in their federal states by permitting checking and a clearing house system 
after 1908, essentially creating a branch system, that strengthened local banking.  This 
branching in the savings bank system did not threaten—indeed may have bolstered – 
certain activities of the money-center banks (discussed later). Not until the 1920s did the 
savings bank system and commercial banks begin to clash. So, consensus within the 
larger group of German bankers, let alone the public at large, was nearly impossible, but 
universalizing instead of splintering was the preferred solution. 
On the highly critical left, the  classic Finanzkapital interpretation appeared in 
1910 at the height of such debates about the concentration of banking power.  As  a 
Marxist economist, Hilferding argued that the bank dominance he observed in Germany 
was  a  natural  outgrowth  of  capitalism,  the  logical  consequence  of  competition.  For 
Hilferding, banks moved from giving short-term credits to providing long-term financing 
for companies, which gave them the power to dominate the management of industrial 
concerns.  For these critics, perhaps mistakenly, the growing role of banks on boards was 
one key indicator.  According to his argument, falling profits due to competition in both 
industry and finance would lead to further consolidation, leading to more power for the 
remaining banks, which had monopoly control over the sources of long-term funds for 
the  ever-increasing  industrial  financing  demands.  However,  Hilferding  accepted  the 
concentration  of  industry  as  an  industrial-capitalist  necessity  (it  proved  Marx’s 
evolutionary theory correct), so he attacked banks and industry for encouraging cartels 
and preventing a more profitable further consolidation of companies. Cartels created just 
enough “monopoly power” for the companies to survive and just enough weakness for 
the companies to become dependent on banks.  Their financial weakness, then, became 
the strength of banks.  Cartels worked then against public interest and the laws of history.  
Finally, socializing a few big companies that already managed crucial economic sectors 
bureaucratically  rather  than  through  freely  competitive  markets  would  be  easier  than 
socializing a great many companies.
106 Such an opinion helped to justify greater mergers 
                                                 
106  Volker  Wellhöner,  Großbanken  und  Großindustrie  im  Kaiserreich  (Göttingen:  Vandenhoeck  & 
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even among the left when Hilferding was Finance Minister that led to such mergers as IG 
Farben,  the  Vereinigte  Stahlwerke,  or  the  unnerving  merger  of  Deutsche  and  the 
Disconto-Gesellschaft in the 1920s.
107 
In America, the concerns of reformers notwithstanding, regulators had since the 
mid-19
th century succeeded in segmenting the sector through state-based unit banking 
laws. For most Europeans, the U.S. banking system seemed oddly splintered.  The history 
of American banking and other regulation reflects American long-standing biases against 
concentrations  of  power  and  helps  explain  the  differences  between  the  German  and 
America debates about finance.  Long before the 1930s, National banks labored with 
severe limitations on their lending and deposits, as well as holding securities in trust.  For 
the  period  under  discussion,  the  U.S.  banking  system  was  a  complex  mixture  of 
nationally and state charted public banks, trust companies, and a variety of different kinds 
of private banks, which were by virtue of their corporate organization privileged and 
disadvantaged in their operations.  Banks that were charted under federal law, national 
banks, such as First National Bank of New York and National City Bank, were prohibited 
from creating acceptances – short-term tradeable securities resembling commercial paper 
today, which were the bedrock of foreign trade and financing until the last third of the 
20
th century – for customers and from opening foreign branches, standard practice in 
Germany among banks and firms.
108  State banks had a variety of different restrictions 
depending on the state in which they were incorporated, but were by and large prohibited 
from engaging in business outside of their states, many prohibited branch banking, and 
from handling bank  acceptances.  After 1908 even the highly localized savings bank 
system in Germany could form statewide branching networks and check clearing houses.   
In contrast, private banks like Morgan had few restrictions but little capacity to 
enter retail business.  In Germany, universal banking, the strength of the large German 
banks, was commonplace, in the U.S. virtually inconceivable.  American banks lived 
with many restrictions on their geographic and business segment reach, which did not 
                                                 
107 See Charles S. Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany and Italy in the 
Decade After World War I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 217-218. 
108 Harold van B. Cleveland and Thomas F. Huertas, Citibank: 1812-1970 (Cambridge: MA.: Harvard 
University  Press,  1985),  pp.  23-43  and  Richard  Sylla,  “Federal  Policy,  banking  market  structure,  and 
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impede German banks as much—the socioeconomic class of business however did.  To 
demonstrate U.S. logic, when American New Deal reformers broke up the big German 
banks  after  1945  along  federalist  lines and attempted  to reform  the German  banking 
system  along  American  lines,  British  banking  experts  could  only  comment  that  the 
Americans were introducing “the worst banking system in the world.”
109 
Although the two countries shared some institutional structures, such as a federal 
system  of  banking,  interlocking  directories  of  banks  on  board,  and  suspicions  about 
speculation, in terms of their attitudes towards markets, cartels, banks, central banks, and 
stock exchanges they remained oceans apart.  These contemporary assumptions, rightly 
or wrongly, drove real politics, real regulatory solutions that led to a great divergence. 
Two examples involving cartels and central banks highlight this great Atlantic divide 
before moving on to assumptions underlying banking regulations more specifically (Part 
II). 
The  passing  of  the  1890  Sherman  Anti-Trust  Act  became  the  symbol  of 
Americans  distrust  of  big  business  and  concentration  of  power.  Although  not 
immediately  enforced  until  the  Knight  trial  of  1894,  it  ushered  in  a  wave  of  anti-
competitive legislation culminating in the Clayton Act of 1914 designed to counteract 
this  insidious  concentration  of  economic  power.  Paradoxically,  American  anti-trust 
legislation was ostensibly directed against “trusts” such as the Rockefeller oil empire, but 
most  effectively  curbed  the  growth  of  price-fixing  agreements  among  firms,  that  is, 
cartels.  Germans not only legally sanctioned cartels in 1897 on grounds that they helped 
stabilize industries in bad times (as “parachutes”), but as an anti-trust or anti-monopoly 
measure since they blocked or slowed concentration into one big firm, which horrified 
them.  Moreover,  the  American  use  of  antitrust  legislation  against  unions  effectively 
destroyed  potential  German  support  for  it  from  the  Social  Democrats;  even  such 
conservatives such as Gustav Schmoller or liberals such as Lujo Brentano sympathized 
with the principle of liberal association and collective bargaining.
110   
                                                 
109  Theo  Horstmann,  Die  Allierten  und  die  deutschen  Grossbanken:  Bankpolitik  nach  dem  Zweiten 
Weltkrieg in Westdeutschland (Bonn, 1991), p. xx. 
110 The cross-cutting intentions, measures, and implications involved with sanctioning cartels between the 
U.S.  and  Germany  are  contrasted  in  Jeffrey  Fear,  Organizing  Control:  August  Thyssen  and  the 
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Another major difference centered on the money supply and the need (or not) for 
a Federal Reserve, which had been for the most part a moot point in Germany since the 
1870s. The final passage of the legislation establishing a new central bank in the U.S. 
required a whole series of further panics to jumpstart talks, especially after the 1907 
panic.  Ironically, they took advice from German financial leaders about the benefits of 
the  Reichsbank  model;  a  very  personal  transnational  German-American  connection 
symbolized by  Max and Paul  Warburg, the latter helped design the Federal Reserve.  
Finally, it required convincing many populists and progressives that a federal bank was 
inevitable and placing it in the hands of the government was clearly the lesser of two 
evils, the greater evil being J. P. Morgan and an all-controlling “Money Trust.”
111  
German and Americans also found their corporate villains in slightly different 
places,  for  different  reasons.  Although  J.  P.  Morgan  essentially  made  very  German 
arguments for responsible bank stewardship of the economy, American populist distrust 
of bankers safely using “other people’s money” eventually eliminated such a solution.  
Indeed Americans translated Jacob Riesser’s neutrally entitled book on the “Development 
History of German Large Banks” into the more problematically entitled Concentration of 
German Banks in 1911.  Riesser’s fairly moderate views found a place in the American 
debate, but to little avail. Americans found enough villains, speculators, “moneycrats,” 
and “robber barons” in their midst—particularly bankers and stock market tycoons—so 
that financial crises became a sort of inexplicable, frenzied, hysterical, collective “panic,” 
an  exercise  in  irrational  crowd  psychology  more  or  less  manipulated  by  insiders 
belonging to a mysterious, dark “money trust.” Sunshine was the best remedy.  In Louis 
Brandeis’ immortal words: “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light 
the most efficient policeman.”  The assumption was if markets were open, free, and fair, 
they would work. 
Germans,  however,  found  their  villains  elsewhere  in  “founders,”  shareholders 
without scruples and no stake in firms as a solid, productive, ongoing entities; such stock 
manipulators duped or fleeced innocent investors who dared to place their money in firms 
                                                                                                                                                 
Jeffrey Fear, “German Capitalism,” Creating Modern Capitalism: How Entrepreneurs, Companies, and 
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barely worth the paper they issued with their names on the header.  The founders’ crash 
of 1873 proved to many Germans that cutthroat capitalism could not work and it needed 
management,  which  helped  justify  a  Reichsbank.  Someone  too  was  needed  to  shield 
investors  from  their  inexperience  and  ensure  only  honest  firms  appear  on  the  stock 
exchange.  It was a paternalist assumption and that role increasingly fell to banks as 
responsible  “stewards”  and  screeners  of  the  respectable  industrial  firm—even  though 
many  Germans  remained  suspicious  of  bankers.  In  fact,  Riesser  thought  that  small 
investors should responsibly stay away from equity investments because of the volatility 
of  share  prices.  By  1913,  in  effect  the  German  business  system  was  successfully 
“Morganized”—and that was largely considered good, not bad, as in the U.S., although 
considerable controversies still arose.  Having a Central Bank in Germany also helped to 
dissociate  the  “panics”  from  the  “manipulations”  of  an  inside  “money  trust.” 
Paradoxically, the establishment of the Federal Reserve in the U.S. could be viewed as a 
means of taking power out of the hands of private bankers.   
To be sure, banking and bankers in Germany certainly had its critics.  The great 
Berlin banks came in for the most criticism unlike the trustworthy local savings banks 
and cooperatives.  Although bankers were still associated with craven money making and 
unwelcome  changes  to  traditional  society,  detested  by  some  elites  and  other  social 
groups,  for  many  Germans,  relationship  banking  brought  “gravitas,”  influence  (often 
viewed problematically as domination), stability, and cooperation.  It was the bankers’ 
very association with industrial entrepreneurs who created real value and whose efforts 
on  export  markets  became  a  source  of  national  pride.    Regulators,  who  attemped  to 
mitigate some of the harsher effects of capitalism by permitting smoothing or taming 
volatility, gave banks a key role in Germany’s capitalist world.  Social sanctions against 
strictly  profit-oriented  motivations  and  economic  success  were  not  strong  enough  to 
prevent entrepreneurial behavior, but, nevertheless, they helped shape the attitudinal and 
institutional context of commercial behavior.
112 
The founding of the Central Association of Banks and Bankers was driven in part 
by the poor reputation of private bankers. Among the Social Democrats, they represented 
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a  hidden  monied  elite  that  dominated  firms;  Hilferding’s  Finanzkapital  was  the  best 
expression of that strain of criticism.  Unlike England with its close alliance between the 
old and new elites, bankers formed an economic elite, but had difficulty as a social and 
political  elite  forming  alliances  with  the  old  aristocratic  elite.  Among  aristocrats  and 
political conservatives, bankers remained too liberal, parvenu, and too Jewish.  A good 
deal  of  the  conservative  (in  an  economic  and  personal  sense),  bürgerlich  image  as 
stewards cultivated by elite bankers was designed to counteract these suspicions, which 
made  bankers  an  fairly  homogenous  social  elite  in  terms  of  their  social  habitus  and 
personal  carriage.    Bankers  became  a  bastion  of  liberal  Bürgerlichkeit  (Victorian-era 
respectability  and  bourgeois  behavior).  Bankers’  image  also  became  immensely 
important for legitimizing their activities and raising their own social status.
113 
In spite of these suspicions, close banking relations with firms and their implicit 
screening and vetting role in founding new firms—a product of 1873—Germans tended 
to view such banking relations as a lesser evil—even if they distrusted bankers.  Banks 
were at least better than the stock market; they permitted good industrial firms from being 
traded like commodities on the immoral casino of the stock market (see Riesser’s lead 
quote).  Many entrepreneurs such as August Thyssen could work closely and collegially 
with many bankers, as long as they did not try to intervene in his business, but refused to 
entertain the idea of listing or issuing shares on the stock market.
114 Whereas America 
finally  opted  for  markets  controlled  by  public  regulators  and  accounting information, 
(transparency to investors and the broader public), Germany relied much more on its 
private  “financial”  experts,  that  is,  bankers  dedicated  to  firms  as  ongoing  concerns 
(responsibility).  
In the U.S., J.P. Morgan tried in vain to make very German, very Riesser-like 
arguments about banks as a source of order, stewardship, and support, but suspicions of 
this  inside  “money  trust”  diluted  banking  power,  especially  after  1914.  The  basic 
                                                 
113 Reitmayer, Bankiers im Kaiserreich, esp. pp. 274-299, 345-363; quotes from p. 274, 352.  Berghoff and 
Köhler, “Redesigning a Class of its Own.”  Recent literature has overturned the idea of feudalization and a 
social alliance among the business elite and aristocracy, see Jürgen Kocka, “The European Pattern and the 
German Case,” Bourgeois Society in Nineteenth-Century Europe, (eds.) Jürgen Kocka and Allan Mitchell 
(Oxford: Berg, 1993), pp. 3-39. For the use of the term bourgeoisie to analyze American history, see Sven 
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schizophrenia of U.S. financial life was its effective reliance on Wall Street investment 
bankers as an implicit central banker whom it really despised and did not trust.  Wall 
Street had such a poor image on Main Street that Paul Warburg declined the first offer to 
head the Federal Reserve because of the "rampant prejudice in this country against a Wall 
Street man;" Warburg had worked at Kuhn, Loeb and Co.
115  Precisely because of this 
heavy reliance on investment bankers’ leadership, a “money trust” of insiders resulted 
that was subsequently skewered in the Pujo Committee report of 1913.
116  Except for the 
boom and bust cycle of 1873, the German stock market and economic growth was also 
not as volatile as the American one because of the Reichsbank’s role of lender of last 
resort and inter-bank cooperation.  Germans desired insiders to tame, stabilize, smooth 
(another alleged virtue of universal banking), and make capitalism respectable. 
In  the  U.S.,  the  basic assumption  was  that  markets  would  work  effectively  if 
people either did not lose their heads in a panic or if evil speculators could not work their 
misdeeds  in  the  dark.    The  U.S.  evinced  a  strange  mixture  of  Christian  messianism 
combined with Adam Smith’s condemnation of urban merchants as insiders and market 
manipulators.  This was the major difference in attitudes and perception between the 
dominant American ideology and that of Germans.  In Germany, markets were indeed 
necessary but inherently volatile, needed taming by countervailing institutions, and made 
to  be  stable  and  respectable  by  responsible  stewards—a  role  that  fell  to  banks  as 
institutions, paradoxically, in spite of considerable suspicions regarding bankers.  Indeed, 
Hartmut Berghoff and Ingo Köhler stress: “The more powerful bankers got, the more 
they  had  to  translate  their  professional  success  into  distinctive  social  and  cultural 
resources that would prove their honest and legitimacy to the public.”
117  In theory, banks 
became  dedicated  shareholders,  responsible  supervisors—share-holders  not  share-
hoppers.  Bankers ‘socialized’ themselves to this political environment.  In the U.S. the 
virtue of transparency dominated, in Germany the virtue of responsibility. 
Although banks in both countries enjoyed similarly close relationships with many 
large companies until being rent apart, these relationships meant something different in 
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Germany and the U.S.  The specific configuration of financial circumstances in the U.S. 
probably required more bank intervention than in Germany.  By default or design, both 
countries used banks to overcome some of the chief problems in corporate governance, 
the free rider problem and informational asymmetries.  For a time, they also allowed 
bankers  to  reap  higher  rents  by  intervening  in  corporate  governance.  In  modern 
terminology, governments outsourced some corporate governance functions.   
Ironically,  Germans  eventually  institutionalized  a  version  of  capitalism 
envisioned by J. P. Morgan, whereby responsible bankers presided over the economy.  J. 
P. Morgan might be characterized as a good ‘German’ banker.  Before World War I, the 
U.S. practiced a “Morganized,” bank-mediated economy, which resembled many features 
of the classic, so-called German model. Just as banks on board of directors grew in the 
first few decades of the 20
th century in both countries, the financial strength of some of 
the larger companies and the development of stronger financial markets started to weaken 
the bank influence over companies.  The process was more intense in the U.S., especially 
after World War I, when the development of an equity culture was later followed by 
legislation that undermined bank intermediation.  Nevertheless, given U.S. banking law, 
poor capital market regulation and dependence on foreign capital, we come down on the 
side  of  those  who  argue that  “Morgan’s Men”  created value,  but  with  qualifications.  
“Morgan and his Men” were not more sophisticated then their European counterparts, as 
some would maintain.
118 Their “great innovations” were to recognize the fault lines of the 
American economy and financial  system,  and  then  bridge  them,  which  brought them 
intense  notoriety.  In  a  financial  environment  in  which  political  ambivalence  about  a 
strong  federal  government  and  centralization  of  financial  power  made  effective 
regulatory financial oversight ineffective and attracting foreign investors more difficult, 
their activities may have been indispensable. 
What  differentiated  the  American  experience  to  a  large  extent  from  that  in 
Germany  was  “Morgan’s”  perceived  lack  of  “socialization”—Wall  Street  not  Main 
Street.  Unlike  his  German  counterparts,  Morgan  and  his  type  of  investment  bankers 
                                                 
118  See  J.  Bradford  De  Long,  “Did  J.P.  Morgan’s  Men  Add  Value?  An  Economist’s  Perspective  on 
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aroused  a  great  deal  of  hatred.    The  proposition  that  his  many  efforts  to  reorganize 
troubled companies or calm down panicky capital markets, which earned him huge fees, 
contributed  to the  public  good  seemed implausible. The  failure  of  the  U.S.  to create 
effective financial institutions to avoid severe panics and corporate corrupt created huge 
“regulatory”  holes  through  which  Morgan  gladly  drove  huge  “trucks”  laden  with 
“goodies.”  The German decision to create a central bank to stabilize monetary policy 
versus the U.S. decision to do without one, until J.P. Morgan had to step in as one during 
times of distress as if J.P. Morgan was the relationship banker for the country, helped turn 
populist  Americans  against  banks  on  board  in  general.    This  greater  role  in  private 
corporate governance played by American banks may have ignited a greater public outcry 
for limiting the power wielded by U.S. banks than was heard in Germany. 
The  next  section  details  how  banks  became  anchored  in  German  corporate 
governance,  and  particularly,  as  intermediaries  on  the  stock  market.    The  crucial 
difference between Germany and the U.S. was not banks on boards of firms, but their role 
in capital markets and their universalism that (allegedly) ‘smoothed’ corporate dividends 
and issuing securities.  
 
II. Institutionalizing Assumptions into Regulations: Making Companies “Solid” and 
Capital Markets “Respectable:” Germany.  
2.1 The 1884 Joint-Stock Company Law 
In the last quarter of the 19
th century, liberal German politicians and academics 
worked to reform corporate and market governance sufficiently to tame more threatening 
conservative and radical challenges to industrialization and private property.  Discussions 
about reform of joint-stock company law began almost immediately following Eduard 
Lasker’s dramatic speech about corporate-government corruption that signaled the end of 
the  founding  bubble  following  the  victory  over  France.  Assembling  Germany’s  top 
economic intellectuals, the Verein für Socialpolitik, founded in 1872 made the first 1873 
volume in their famous research series about the need to reform joint-stock companies. 
According to the Association of German Lawyers (Deutscher Justiz-Tag) reforms should 
above  all  “prevent  unsolid  foundings  or  abuses  in  the  administration  of  joint-stock 
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Peter Hommelhoff, the main problem was that “founders” (Gründer)—a derogatory term 
at the time—started up new companies only as a means to make a profit, then cashed out, 
a  sort  of  shell  game  with  gullible  investors.  Corporate  law  reform  after  1873  was 
designed to counteract the fraudulent or frivolous creation of companies as mere “stock 
exchange  commodities”  (Börsenware)  by  unscrupulous  founders  or  shareholders. 
Insiders also sold their stock more quickly, leaving outside investors holding Pfennigs on 
their investment.  Indeed the crash regularly saw 50-90% drops in the share price of even 
‘solid’ firms. 
For Germans, the founder’s crash cemented the attitude and image of backroom 
shareholders,  not  as  venture  capitalists  or  heroic  owner-entrepreneurs,  but  as  mere 
speculators, let alone potential cheats. The intention to protect the long-term “objective 
needs of the enterprise” from the short-term, profit-taking of disinterested, potentially 
dangerous shareholders ran like a “red thread” through the history of German corporate 
law, according to Hommelhoff.  The Nazis enshrined an extreme version of this attitude 
in its corporate law of 1937 that essentially made shareholders parasites on the body of 
the corporation, which was the healthy “cell” or “working community” of the national 
economy.
119 
This fundamental attitude permeated German corporate governance in ways that 
tended to protect the enterprise as an ongoing concern rather than protect investors as in 
the U.S., although the 1884 company law strengthened shareholder protection as well.  
Indeed,  one  of  the  main  goals  of  the  reform  was  to  make  the  shareholders’  general 
assembly the ultimate decision-maker and arbiter for the firm—in theory.  One of the 
fundamental  principles  invoked  by  the  1884  company  law  was  the  strengthening  of 
shareholder rights, especially vis-à-vis (dishonest) promoters.  In practice, it did not quite 
work  in  the  intended  way  for  reasons  discussed  immediately  below.
120  Until  Nazi-
sanctioned  total  managerial  control  that  excluded  shareholders,  German  reformers 
bounced between the poles of too much “Smithian” laissez faire or too much prescriptive 
                                                 
119  Peter  Hommelhoff,  “Eigenkontrolle  statt  Staatskontrolle—rechtsdogmatischer  Überblick  zur 
Aktienrechtsreform 1884,” Hundert Jahre modernenes Aktienrecht (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1985), p. 
56.  Also  Werner  Schubert,  “Die  Entstehung  des  Aktiengesetzes  vom  18.  Juli  1884,”  Hundert  Jahre 
moderenes Aktienrecht (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1985), pp. 1-13, quote from p. 6. 
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regulatory  control,  which  played  itself  out  in  the  debate  about  corporate  governance 
reform.  
The  1884  company  law  successfully  avoided  greater  state  supervision  of 
corporations (advocated by the influential conservative economist, Adolph Wagner) by 
strengthening  “self-control”  (Eigenkontrolle)  among  three  counterbalancing  private 
interests represented by the three main “organs” of the joint-stock company: executive 
board, supervisory board, and general assembly.  In spite of some attempts to outlaw the 
joint-stock  form  altogether,  or  nationalizing  or  founding  state-owned  enterprises  to 
counteract private monopolies, cooler heads prevailed in the commission appointed to 
reforming  German  corporate  governance.  Liberal  incorporation  laws  were  essentially 
retained, but the reforms strengthened the role of banks, dedicated shareholders, or other 
firms on German supervisory boards. The ultimate goal of reforms was to create “full 
transparency  and  responsibility”  (“volle  Oeffentlichkeit  und  Verantwortlichkeit”) 
particularly in regards the founding of new firms.
121  The solutions proved highly robust, 
laying the foundations for German corporate governance until the 1990s.  As we argue, 
Germans tended to stress responsibility and voice more than transparency and potential 
exit, eventually leading to stunningly different corporate governance paths. 
The debates surrounding corporate governance reform were surprisingly modern, 
sensible (even if one could debate their finer points or disagree with the particularities 
about the solution), and broached classic, sensitive issues of corporate governance. They 
argued about issues about how prescriptive and detailed regulations could become before 
constraining entrepreneurial freedom too much. The Reich’s Imperial Court stressed that 
complicated,  detailed  rules  would  only  raise  the  costs  of  business,  particularly  in  a 
depressed time that needed to see an economic upswing. Some thought no amount of 
rules  could  save  people  from  unethical  entrepreneurs  or  from  their  own  greed  or 
inexperience as investors; proscribing too many rules would never be sufficient.  How 
much liability should board members have?  How could one differentiate dishonest abuse 
from poor business judgment? How independent should supervisory board members be 
and how much influence should they have over the executive board?  Should there be 
                                                 
121 Schubert, “Die Entstehung des Aktiengesetzes,” p. 5, from Verhandlungen des Vereins für Socialpolitik, 
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independent audits and who should carry them out, and how often?  How much should 
the state be involved with setting standards?  Or how much should autonomy should 
business have to establish self-governing professional rules? Should there be one-share, 
one-vote or should the law continue to permit non-voting shares or preferred shares?  
Should a required reserve fund be established or should all profits go to shareholders?
122 
The key commission established in 1882 to sort these issues out tried to find a 
balance between the two extremes.  The commission consisted of a number of business 
luminaries  (such  as  Adalbert  Delbrück,  politician  and  banker;  Richard  Koch,  later 
Reichsbank President, or Emil Russell, director of the Berliner Disconto-Gesellschaft), 
academics (Adolph Wagner, Hermann von Sicherer, Levin Goldschmidt), and slew of 
government officials.  A full discussion cannot be attempted here, but a few of the main 
debating points highlight key assumptions that shaped this crucial law. 
One  of  the  liveliest  debates  regarded  minimal  nominal  share  values,  which 
bounced up and down between a suggested 1000 and 5000 Marks.  Some recommended 
minimal shares as high as 5000 Marks to “protect small investors” from themselves.  It 
would  also  help  prevent  the  founding  of  subquality  firms  that  damaged  the  whole 
economy; only serious firms would be founded.  In Parliament, left-liberal and national 
liberal parties thought they detected a certain “spirit of suspicion and mistrust” in regards 
the joint-stock company.  They complained that minority protections and the liabilities of 
directors were too high.  Banks issuing shares were also held liable for any dishonest 
dealings during the startup phase. Another parliamentarian warned about the creation of a 
potential “fee-oriented and clique-based system” on boards.  Delbrück criticized the law 
as being  “mistaken” (verfehlt), “distant from practice,” and granting too many powers to 
the “dead capital” of the general assembly.  He objected to the law declaring the totality 
of  shareholders  of  the  general  assembly  as  the  ultimate  decision-maker  for  the  firm 
(Willensorgan).  The wealth of nations, he said, was not made up by the “fullness of 
property,” but by the “fullness of the acquiring powers” (erwerbenden Kräfte).  Another 
official  thought  that  with  all  the  protections  against  abuse  in  boards,  all  the  new 
regulations simply moved the “unscrupulousness” to the backrooms of the shareholders 
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or their “dark” representatives, which would make the company the “game ball of the 
most dishonest interests.” 
The 1884 law strengthened key shareholder protections.  Especially through the 
supervisory board and shareholders’ meeting, shareholders could alter company statutes 
or hire and, most importantly, hire and fire executive board members, one of the key new 
powers  of  control  of  the  supervisory  board  over  management.  Corporate  governance 
reformers drew the conclusion to strengthen the supervisory capacity of the supervisory 
board,  while  circumscribing  their  executive  activities.  It  delineated  more  closely 
supervisory board responsibilities and prohibited them from intervening in day-to-day 
decision-making; the supervisory board could also call for special corporate audits with a 
majority.  Individuals could not be present on both boards simultaneously.   
Shareholder  control  was  asserted  primarily  by  their  annual  election  of  their 
representatives  to  the  supervisory  board.    Another  basic  idea  was  to  strengthen 
managerial autonomy from activist, meddling shareholders merely out to maximize their 
short-term  dividends  in  the  interest  of  the  ongoing  concern.    While  each  individual 
shareholder  had  the  right  to  appeal  or  contest  stipulations,  certain  share  proportion 
thresholds  limited  small  investor  activism.  Over  time—and  inadvertently—this 
supervisory board representation of shareholder interests strengthened the influence of 
banks on board. 
The 1884 joint-stock law ultimately raised minimum par value of shares to 1,000 
Marks ($ 240 at the time, but equal to roughly $ 40,000 in today’s dollars) in order “to 
protect small investors, who cannot judge the business condition and management of a 
joint-stock company, from participating in it and potentially losing their savings.” Only 
other companies or the relatively rich could buy stock. The state essentially evoked a 
paternalistic  act  to  protect  its  less  rich  citizens,  but,  along  with  other  measures,  this 
helped dampen equity markets in favor of credit-based banks.
123 
The thrust of corporate law reforms (and stock market reforms, discussed below) 
encouraged  long-term  investment  in  and  commitment  to  manufacturing  companies, 
                                                 
123 Quoted in Eube, Der Aktienmarkt in Deutschland, 36; on the important 1896 Exchange Act, see 43–49.   
For  greater  detail,  see  Hommelhoff,  “Eigenkontrolle  statt  Staatskontrolle.”    The  book  reproduces  the 
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reflecting  German  discomfort  with  impersonal,  speculative  capitalism.  They  and  this 
corporate governance law evinced a general preference for what one economist has called 
voice  and  loyalty  (working  to  inside  institutions  to  influence  their  behavior)  to  exit 
(simply  disengaging).
124  German  corporate  governance  seemed  to  be  designed  to 
concentrate  power  so  that  a  small  number  of  dedicated,  responsible,  and  respectable 
entrepreneurs,  managers,  and  financiers—prior  to  1914  to  a  large  extent  personally 
connected with one another and increasingly concentrated in Berlin—could responsibly 
steer a “productive” economy, which was becoming technologically and organizationally 
ever more complicated, let alone beset by conflicting social pressures.  The regulations 
were  expressly  designed  to  avoid  the  tragedies  surrounding  the  founding  of  new 
companies.   
Even outsiders appreciated what measures had been taken in Germany to protect 
markets and shareholders.  Contrasting British and German company and stock market 
laws, one English observer found that in Germany every conceivable measure had been 
taken  to  protect  investors  from  being  deceived  or  misled  by  misstatements  in  a 
prospectus.  Germany had created the most stringent responsibilities for directors.  The 
admissions committee of the stock exchange, which included able bankers and business 
people, went well beyond the British practice of certifying the prospectus for technical 
correctness.  The committee’s opinion gives a clear indication of the merit of a security, 
even  at  the  risk  of  being  sued  for  libel.    The  committee  demanded  explanations  for 
information and carefully investigated the facts and figures presented in the prospectus.  
Moreover:    
The  prospectus  has  to  be  signed  by  the  issuing  firms,  which  make 
themselves responsible for the correctness of statements, and at the same 
time place their prestige and credit as issuing houses at stake. … 
All this is apt to create an atmosphere of confidence and trust in industrial 
stocks, the more so as the banks themselves are represented on the Boards 
of  Directors  and exercise  considerable  influence  in the  management  of 
affairs,  not  only  in  its  financial,  but  also  in  its  general  aspects.    The 
experience of bankers being connected with a vast number of different 
concerns (some of them are on the Boards of 40 or more companies, and 
the Dresdner Bank states in its jubilee publication that it is represented on 
the  Boards  of  200  companies),  thereby  gaining  inside  knowledge  of 
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various industries, is often very valuable even in technical matters, and 




There is no reason to believe at face value that German company law solved all the issues 
involved with  the  corporate  governance of  modern  corporation, but  they  dealt  in the 
1880s  effectively  with  fundamental  issues  still  relevant  today;  this  contemporary 
inadvertently makes regulators’ goals, objectives, and assumptions clear: responsibility. 
As discussed above, large universal banks increasingly played an important role 
in the supervisory boards of most large, listed German firms.  Most contemporary policy 
makers agreed with Karl Helfferich, director of the Deutsche Bank and Finance Minister 
during the war, when he wrote that in the face of enormous capital needs, shortages of 
capital for Germany’s great advances in technical, industrial development during the 25 
years  preceding  World  War  I,  German  banks  had  succeeded  in  “keeping  the  proper 
balance between intensive capital employment and fundamental security.”
126  Part of that 
balance  lay  in  preserving  independent  companies,  coordinated  by  large  industrial 
organizations  like  cartels,  syndicates  or  communities  of  interest 
(Interessengemeinschaften), which had, according to Helfferich, many of the benefits of 
the  large  American  Trusts,  such  as  limiting  production,  but  avoided  “the  chaotic 
competition”  and  economic  waste  and  tensions  inherent  to  “unplanned”  commercial 
endeavors.
127 Again, whether true or not or whether truly effective or not, these stated 
values  reflected  attitudes  of  many  contemporary  Germans  that  translated  into  the 
objectives of regulation. 
As financial advisors, market makers, and members of Aufsichtsräte, they could 
provide  investors  with  an  acceptable  tradeoff  between  security,  liquidity,  and  overall 
returns  by  allegedly  smoothing  fluctuations  for  both  markets  and  companies.    Even 
though separation of banking activities was proposed in Germany long before the Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933 was passed in the United States, it was rejected because Germans, 
by  and  large,  felt  comfortable  with  the  role  of  banks  as  an  acceptable  antidote  to 
                                                 
125 Joseph, Evolution of German Banking, pp. 116-117. 
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instability,  corporate volatility, and  a means of  achieving balanced economic  growth.  
Universal banking and stewardship in industrial firms ensured smoothing of financial 
results.  The influential business professor, Adolf Weber, justified universal banking so:  
The investment banking activity (Spekulationstätigkeit), in particular the 
emissions business, seems to me to become a reasonable goal of a solid 
joint-stock company first when it is bound to regular banking business.  A 
large  private  banking  house  can  deal  with  this  even  during  the  ‘quiet 
times’ that might last years.  It is much more difficult to do this for a pure 
joint-stock investment bank (Spekulationsaktienbank).  The care of regular 
[commercial] banking business is on one hand capable even in periods of 
bubbles to put a stop to the desire to speculate by bank executives within 
appropriate limits; on the other hand, it makes possible even in those times 
in  which  equity  markets  competely  collapse  to  distribute  ‘decent 
dividends,’  by  which  the  [combination]  of  investment  and  commercial 
banks (Spekulations- und Depositenbank) achieve a solidity and stability 
that  an  institute,  which  exclusively  devotes  itself  to  irregular  banking 
business,  even  with  the most  careful direction  is  hardly  possible  to  be 
reached.  On top of this there is a further advantage in the combination of 
activity, by which the investment bank has available as a commercial bank 
through numerous ‘current-account clients’ to encourage and place new 
emissions speedily and securely with relatively low costs…
128   
 
Weber  went  on  to  argue  that  the  venture  capital  provided  by  German  banks  proved 
increasingly  “more  solid”  over  time  because  the  large  German  banks  learned  from 
experience  to  spread  risk  geographically  and  over  many  industrial  sectors,  thereby 
creating a greater “quiet in the rhythm of our national economy.”
129  Hedge funds today 
might not say it any better.   
Not surprisingly, banks, the main creditors of major businesses made it a policy to 
smooth the issuing of securities and individual corporate dividends over time—to the 
advantage of creditors and underwriters, that is, banks.  Another contemporary British 
expert contrasted the British and German relationship of banks to clients, especially those 
clients whose securities the banks underwrite: 
The banks recommend industrial securities to their clients, and regulate 
the market if there is need.   Important transactions take place daily in 
Berlin and on the other German bourses, and the public invests largely in 
                                                 
128  Adolf  Weber,  Depositenbanken  und  Spekulationsbanken:  Ein  Vergleich  deutschen  und  englischen 
Bankwesens (München: Duncker & Humblot, 1915), pp. 340-341. 
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them, knowing that they are carefully managed and supervised.  Under 
banking influence, it has become more and more the policy of industrial 
companies to build up such reserves as to avoid too sharp fluctuations in 
the  dividend  distributions.    The  balance  sheet  of  the  General  Electric 
Company [AEG], Siemens & Halske, Gelsenkirchen, Phoenix, Höchster 
Farbwerke [Höchst], and many others, give clear evidence to that effect.  
Actually some of the bigger concerns strengthened their financial position 
to such an extent that they have come independent of banking credit,  … . 
Nevertheless intimate relations with the banks are continued.   
The manner in which issues of securities are guaranteed and manipulated 
differs from the underwriting syndicate in England…. When the issue has 
been made and has been fully subscribed, the syndicate may be, but need 
not necessarily be, dissolved, because, for the purpose of activating and 
stabilising  the  market,  the  syndicate  leaders  may  decide  to  keep  it 
together,  in  order  to  be  able  to  repurchase  stock  that  is  offered  by 
subscribers  after  the  issue.    If  the  issue  is  unsuccessful,  the  syndicate 
continues until the date fixed, and may even be prolonged.  There is this 
advantage,  firstly,  the  market  cannot  be  prejudiced  and  spoiled  by 
underwriters who sell below issue price in anticipation of an allotment, 
thereby—taking  into  consideration  the  underwriting  commission—still 
securing a profit, and secondly that, after the issue, support is forthcoming, 
whilst the syndicate members, who are tied up, and do not get possession 
of the securities, cannot dispose of their interest.  On the other hand, the 
English underwriting system is bound to bring the plain facts, the real state 
of affairs, to light; after the issue the underwriters are informed of the 
result and they can deal with the amount which they are called upon to 
take  up  at  their  discretion.    Consequently  a  genuine  market  becomes 
established, the new securities will find their own level.  Should there be 
little  or  no  inquiry  for  new  issues  in  normal  times,  even  at  attractive 
prices,  it  proves  that  no  capital  is  available  for  investment,  and 
underwriters unable to sell or only able to sell at considerable loss are 
warned in this way.  In other words the English system creates a natural 
market, the German system in many cases an artificial one.
 130 (Our stress) 
 
Such were the tradeoffs between transparency and responsibility.  
This tradeoff and implicit collective preference behind political decisions made 
banks in German corporate governance, as this historian Richard Tilly wrote: 
Finance (in Germany) is a matter of small-group negotiation rather than 
the reading of anonymous price signals, and it frequently reflects banker 
initiative.  ‘Universal  banking’  –  union  of  commercial  and  investment 
activities–had  banks  closely  monitoring  their  customers’  activities, 
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This  role  of  banks,  moreover,  contributed  to  many  political  goals  of  the  state  and 
consistent with many other measures taken after 1873 to protect society from the effects 
of industrialization such as more proscribed rights for workers, nationalization of some 
important  industries,  higher  tariffs  on  many  goods,  cartelization  of  much  of  German 
industry, and increased pressure on banks to moderate the harsh effects of capitalism by 
lending even through hard times—one of the key alleged virtues of relationship banking.  
German banks cooperated with the government to root out speculative profits and abusive 
transactions in the stock market, such as buying stocks at their face value and reselling 
them to the market at a higher price.
132   
By holding deposits and investing in corporations, Deutsche Bank and the other 
German  universal  banks,  served  as  a  useful  long-term  bridge  between  investors  and 
industry that appeared to be largely in the public’s interest.  The otherwise intolerable 
mismatch  of  deposits  with  risky  industrial  investments  inherent  to  banking  was  also 
somewhat mitigated by steady investment guidance of the universal bankers, who advised 
both the users and the providers of loanable funds.  The banks with their seats and active 
participation on supervisory boards preserved the personal dimension of capitalism that 
many Germans liked about entrepreneurial firms. 
The  inevitable  conflicts  of  interest  between  the  bank’s  role  as  overseer  and 
principal seller of financial services was hardly questioned during prosperous periods, as 
it was seen as an acceptable price, agency cost, of effective social and economic control 
of firms.  Partly because of public suspicion, German bankers knew that they had to 
foster an image of reliability, social consciousness, and high cultural prestige (such as 
with philanthropy or support of the arts).  (To this day, the Deutsche Bank has one of the 
largest  art  collections  in  the  world,  which  makes  no  sense  from  a  purely  functional 
economic viewpoint.)  Banks took risks as venture capitalists in new Second Industrial 
Revolution  firms,  but  their  responsibility  as  the  public  trustee  of  capitalism  weighed 
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heavily  on  bankers,  who  worked  hard  on  public  relations  campaigns  to  dissociate 
themselves from the evils of the stock market.
133  
Ultimately,  then  German  corporate  governance  was  designed  to  protect 
individuals from themselves, from instability and from, above all, speculation, which was 
ill defined, but associated with short-term money making or, more generally, making 
money from money, as Aristotle put it, the “breeding of money.”
134 As one contemporary 
noted:  “’The  Stock  Exchange  must  bleed’  was  a  popular  cry  for  a  long  time.”
135  
However suspicious, banks offered a sort of paternalistic, guarding, protective role for 
investors and their clients, the industrial firms.  They became anchored in the supervisory 
boards  of  German  companies,  somewhat  inadvertently,  but  they  played  the  intended 
dedicated role promoted by the 1884 law.  This stabilizing, guardian role extended to 
their role in public accounting and on the stock exchange. 
 
2.2  The Stock Exchange, the Stamp Act, and Banking Stewardship 
 
In spite of the weight in the Finanzkapital historiography accorded to banks on 
German corporate boards, we want to argue in this next section that the most peculiar 
aspect of German corporate governance in regards banks’ role was Germany’s capital-
market legislation, which gave large banks a privileged role in equity transactions.  There 
was no path-dependency or ‘lock-in effect’ until capital markets collapsed after the war, 
which made bank financing even more important.  The key 1896 Stock Exchange Act 
tightened regulations and strengthened the role of banks as key intermediaries on the 
stock market in the interest of corporate solidity, dampening unhealthy speculation, and 
mitigating volatility.
136  One measure what a decisive turning point this Act marks is that 
                                                 
133 Gall, 49.  The Central Banking association’s house journal, The Bank Archiv, as well as other journals 
praised banking for its national consciousness and responsible oversight of industrial development.  These 
efforts were relatively successful.  Before World War I, the view that the banks were already working in 
the national interest, had adequate self-regulation, and, therefore, needed no further state regulation was 
widely held inside and outside Germany. 
134 “Politics,” The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random, 1941) 1141. 
135 Joseph, Evolution of German Banking, p. 29. 
136 Key texts on this Act are Steffen Eube, Der Aktienmarkt in Deutschland (Frankfurt/Main: Fritz Knapp 
Verlag,  1998),  on  the  important  1896  Exchange  Act,  see  pp.  43–49.    Johann  Christian  Meier,  Die 
Entstehung des Börsengesetzes vom 22. Juni 1896 (St. Katharinen: Scripta Mercaturae Verlag, 1992).  Max 
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not until 1989 were futures and options again permitted on the Deutsche Börse; more 
complicated derivatives could not be developed or traded until the First Financial Market 
Promotion Act of 1990, which also eliminated myriad taxes on securities trading.   
Futures and options were the first derivatives and they came in for heavy criticism 
particularly  in  the  commodity  grain  trade  in  both  the  U.S.  and  Germany.    Brokers 
appeared  to  gamble  with  the  most  necessary  staple  of  ordinary  life  and  with  the 
livelihoods of ordinary farmers. In both the U.S. and Germany, the association of the 
stock  market  with  a  casino,  a  “fictitious,”  “unnatural”,  “phantom,”  “immoral,” 
“unproductive,” game (Börsenspiel) was more than common. One German contemporary, 
Joseph  Neuwirth,  called  the  stock  exchange  a  “pure  hellish  gambling  den”  (pure 
Spielhölle).  When the liberal, Eduard Lasker, spoke of the stock market as an “academy 
for  circumventing  the  law,”  he  met  roaring,  approving  laughter  by  his  fellow 
Parliamentarians.  Even prior to the 1873 crash, the exchange seemed to many nothing 
more than a rigged casino offering limitless reward with little risk.  The free, uncontrolled 
movements  in  prices  seemed  to  be  incontrovertible  evidence  that  there  was  nothing 
objective (sachlich) in their pricing.  Those movements offered too many opportunities 
for  speculation.  By  contrast,  long-term  banking  relations  built  on  equity,  credit 
transactions,  and  supervisory  board  relations,  however,  helped  transform  banks  from 
mere investors (speculators), into partners with industrial enterprises. Speculative fever 
was fueled especially by seemingly exotic transactions like uncovered forward sales or 
futures  or  shorting  (Termingeschäft,  Differenzgeschäft,  “differences,”  “setting-off,” 
shorting (borrowing shares to buy them back at a lower price) or “naked shorts” (without 
even borrowing)), all of which “one could sell, what one doesn’t have, and one can buy 
what one never wants to take possession of.”  Futures, the first derivatives, came in for 
particular criticism as they arbitraged time contracts, derivatives, rather than the actual 
physical delivery of commodities—the ultimate airy speculation let loose like a balloon 
from the real world.  But it affected people’s lives, particularly that of powerful agrarian 
                                                                                                                                                 
Crosby Emery, “The Results of the German Exchange Act of 1896,” Political Science Quarterly 13 (1898): 
286–320; Caroline Fohlin, “Regulation, Taxation and the Development of the German Universal Banking 
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interests in both the U.S. and Germany, a sector hit hard by globalization and declining 
prices.
137   
What  is  remarkable  about  the  discussions  regarding  the  stock  exchange  and 
speculation  in  the  U.S.  and  Germany  is  how  parallel  they  were  (beginning  with  a 
vehemence in 1891), but the results diverged dramatically because of differing attitudes 
toward banks (more accurately, relationship banking) and the political weight of agrarian 
power. For instance, in regards futures trading in both countries, rising pressure to bank 
futures simmered in the 1880s, but burst forth in the early 1890s.  In 1894, the U.S. 
Congress held hearings on futures trading, which was referenced in the 1896 German 
parliamentary debates and subsequent 1896 legislation.  In 1891, the populist National 
Farmers’ Alliance put the first organized proposal to prohibit futures.  As a result of 
sinking  prices  in  1892,  German  agrarians  formed  the  powerful  Association  of 
Agriculturalists  (Bund  der  Landwirte),  one  of  the  most  powerful  lobbies  of  pre-1913 
Germany.  Their program called for “sharper state supervision of commodity exchanges 
to  prevent  an  arbitrary,  damaging  price  formations  harming  agriculturalists  and 
consumers in an equal manner.”  One Catholic party member declared that futures trading 
                                                 
137 Glagau, Börsen- und Gründungschwindel, Bd. 1, p. 4 quoted in  Meier, Entstehung des Börsengesetzes, 
p. 9; Neuwirth quote also from Meier, p. 9; for a discussion about futures, see pp. 27-43.  Also see Knut 
Borchardt (Hg.), Max Weber Börsenwesen: Schriften und Reden 1893-1898 (Bd. 1-2) (Tübingen: J.C.B. 
Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1999); see Bd. 1, pp. 26-31 for the public perceptions of stock markets and how it 
influenced legal prescriptions.  American popular opinions of the stock market were hardly more positive at 
the time and futures on grain were just as controversial.  See Jonathan Ira Levy, “Contemplating Delivery: 
Futures Trading and the problem of Commodity Exchange in the United States 1875-1905,” American 
Historical Review, Vol. 111, No. 2 (April 2006), pp. 307-335.  See David A. Zimmerman, Panic: Markets, 
Crises, & Crowds in American Fiction (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), esp. pp. 81-
122 on Thomas Lawson.  Lawson was a former Wall Street insider, who published Frenzied Finance: The 
Crime of the Amalgamated (New York: Ridgway, 1905).  Julia Ott marks the war bonds drive during WWI 
as the crucial turning point in American attitudes toward the stock market, see Julia Ott, “The ‘Free and 
Open’ ‘People’s Market:’ Public Relations at the New York Stock Exchange 1913-1929,” Business and 
Economic  History  On-Line,  Vol.  2  (2004),  1-43,  aailable  at 
www.thebhc.org/publications/BEHonline/2004/Ott.pdf.    It is  based  on  her  dissertation,  Julia Ott,  When 
Wall Street met Main Street: The Quest for an Investors’ Democracy and the Emergence of the American 
Retail Investor 1900-1930 (Dissertation: Yale University, 2006).  Especially after the depression and the 
Second  World  War, the  New  York  Stock  Exchange  had  major legitimation issues,  see  Janice  Traflet, 
“’Own Your Share of American Business:’ Public Relations at the NYSE during the Cold War,” Business 
and  Economic  History  On-Line,  Vol.  1  (2003),  pp.  1-21,  available  at 
www.thebhc.org/publications/BEHonline/2003/Traflet.pdf.    Ibid.,  “Spreading  the  Ideal  of  Mass 
Shareownership: Public Relations and the NYSE,” Essays in Economic and Business History (2004), pp. 
257-273.  Ibid., Spinning the NYSE: Power and Public Relations at the Big Board (Dissertation: Colombia 
University, 2004).  As we noted in our article “Diverging Paths,” the collapse in value of German war 
bonds in the great inflation and the continuing weakness of equity markets in the Weimar Republic had the 
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should be “bled to death” through high taxes; another wanted generally higher taxes on 
stock exchange trading: “the higher, the better.”
138 
Aside from the one goal of dampening (if not destroying) futures trading as well 
slowing short-term “speculative” trading, the creation of the Stamp Tax (a tax on security 
transactions)  is  the  best  example  demonstrating  the  political  willingness  to  stress 
universal banking as an acceptable social control on investing.  Under the original Stock 
Exchange Taxation Act of 1881, all stock market transactions entailed a tax for the first 
time,  initial  issues  as  well  as  seasoned  offerings  and  subsequent  trading.  Only  the 
securities of central and state governments, and the transactions of charitable and public 
organizations, such as professional groups, were exempted.  A later 1884 amendment, 
prompted by conservative parties, substituted a fixed tax per transaction for one based on 
a percentage of the amounts traded.
139  The act was modified many times.
140  Initially, the 
amount of the tax was relatively small, initially amount to 1/10
th of a percent per 1000 
mark of market value, or 10 pfennig for a one-thousand mark transaction, but posed many 
potential  problems  for  financial  institutions  and  their  customers.
141  Both  parties  to  a 
transaction were libel for the tax.  Merely keeping track of what was owed added a lot of 
new transaction costs for brokers; those that could afford to do it were large banks. 
By 1894, the amounts for some transactions had trebled, causing great concern for 
traders,  brokers,  and  bankers.  Although  his  bank  would  ultimately  profit  enormously 
from these pre-World War I laws and regulations governing securities transfers, Georg 
Siemens, chairman of Deutsche Bank’s Vorstand and a member of the Reichstag, argued 
that  the  stamp  tax  was  deliberately  aimed  at  reducing  capital  movement  and  risked 
                                                 
138  Compare,  Levy,  “Contemplating  Delivery,”  pp.  322-327;  Borchardt,  “Einleitung,”  Max  Weber 
Börsenwesen, pp. 66-74; quote from p. 70.  Also Meier, Entstehung des Börsengesetzes,” p. 238. 
139 Gall, 82 -84. 
140  Karl  Bott,  ed.  Handwörterbuch  des  Kaufmanns:  Lexikon  für  Handel  und  Industrie  (Hamburg: 
Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1927) 385-386. 
141 Riesser, Die deutschen Groβbanken und ihre Konzentration, p. 502.  According to Fritz Neumark in 
“Die Finanzpolitik in der Zeit von dem I. Weltkrieg,” in Währung und Wirtschaft in Deutschland 1876-
1975, ed. Deutsche Bundesbank (Frankfurt am Main: Fritz Knapp, 1976), p. 90, the amounts collected from 
the  tax  in  1913  made  up  a  significant  portion  of  the  Reich’s  income,  but  he  does  not  give  basis  of 
calculation in that year.  According to Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich, (Berlin: Puttkammer 
& Mühlbrecht, 1913) 334, the tax amounted to nearly 7% of all Reich tax collections.  Collections from the 
tax were up by 50% from the amount collected in 1909.  It is important to remember that Germany had no 
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driving business outside of Germany. He also addressed what he considered the broader 
intentions  of  those  who  designed  the  law,  namely  to  exercise  greater  control  over 
economic activity, which he believed to be a dangerous tendency.  According to Siemens, 
business  people  were  the  ones  who  lived  and  died  by  knowing  their  markets  and 
matching needs with resources, not bureaucrats.   Like Gerson von Bleichröder, one of 
Germany’s leading private bankers, he feared that the law would entail more regulatory 
intrusion into bank affairs.
142  Implementing the tax law would require the government to 
investigate, or at least, be capable of investing all transactions.  A lot of information 
about transactions had to be recorded and open to minor bureaucrats, who might use that 
information in ways that might be harmful for the banks’ business interests.  “Precisely 
with this control issue, the creators of the law are hitting business people in their most 
vulnerable place.”
143  Because of the bureaucratic requirements, only larger banks could 
afford to transact more heavily.  Between the costs of heavy trading and bureaucracy, 
Riesser  argued  that  this  led  to  greater  bank  concentration—which,  of  course,  those 
legislators did not want either.  In addition, the stamp tax hurt the competitiveness of 
German stock markets relative to other national stock exchanges and harmed the liquidity 
and fluidity necessary on the stock exchange so that it would reflect proper pricing (so 
Riesser).
144    So  ironically,  although  the  taxes  actually  drove  business  and  more 
responsibility into the hands of the larger banks, few German bankers actually liked it. 
Like several other pieces of legislation proposed around the same time, such as a 
direct tax on passive income, the stamp tax seemed directed at those who made their 
living  with  passive  income  and  to  thwart  stock-market  speculation  by  adding  to  the 
transaction costs of buying and selling stocks quickly.  For the general public, the stock 
market provided no more social value than a casino. One German Commerce minister 
called the stock exchange “a poison tree … casting a baleful shadow over the nation.”
145  
As  one  historian  wrote,  “Dealing  on  the  stock  exchange  was  regarded  as  peculiarly 
unproductive sin as it brought no visible results, created no values and basically served 
                                                 
142 Stern, Gold and Iron, pp. 220-221. 
143 Georg Siemens speech to the Reichstag, January 21, 1885, Stenographische Berichte des Deutsches 
Reichstags (Berlin, 1885). 
144 Riesser, Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der deutschen Grossbanken, pp. 187-199. 
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no  purpose  but  that  of  speculation.”
146  The  framers  of  the  bill  hoped  that  it  would 
encourage stability (few trades and less panic) and long-term capital investment, while 
hurting mostly Jewish stock brokers, who were in their eyes the true culprits behind the 
speculation and panic.   The association of speculation and anti-Semitism was always 
close.  Jews were overrepresented in the banking profession relative to their proportion in 
the total population that ‘proved’ to those who wanted to believe it that Jews were wire-
pullers of the exchange. 
Despite resistance from the banking community, a new stamp tax law was passed 
in 1885 and went into effect in 1886. It proved to be a boon for the large ones, in another 
way.  Banks effectively began to substitute for the stock market in individual transactions 
in-house, circumventing the tax, leaving the stock exchange itself principally for clearing 
settlements already transacted among banks. It is unclear whether the intent of the law 
was  to  make  the  large  banks  intermediary  institutions  that  would  somehow  protect 
individuals from that den of inequity, the stock market.  Some believed that this was the 
intention of the framers, but it was probably mostly unintentional.  As early as the spring 
of 1884, the Frankfurter Zeitung wrote that the new law would lead “to a monopoly of 
bank business in a few powerful hands.”
147  Others believed that the economic ignorance 
of legislators was so great that there was no telling what the laws that they draft would 
produce.
148     
The stamp tax was also passed for several reasons, not the least of which was to 
raise  central  government  revenues,  which,  because  of  Germany’s  constitution  was  a 
regular  source  of  conflict.  Some  supporters  disappointingly  hoped  that  it  would 
strengthen the position of small- and mid-sized banks.  That it led to the exact opposite 
effect for those banks – that is, strengthening the large banks – requires understanding the 
history of the law and the structure of the banking sector.   
There  were  three  types  of  banks  in  Germany:  large,  universal  banks,  like 
Deutsche Bank; small private banks, like the Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft, and small 
regional banks.  Of the three, only the universal banks had large a wealthy client base and 
                                                 
146 Gall, p. 82. 
147 Quoted in Riesser, p. 502.  May 26, 1884 issue, nr. 147. 
148 Riesser Speech, Verhandlungen des ersten Allgemeinen Deutschen Bankiertages, September 19 und 20, 
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a seat on the exchange. Within a few decades, the law had weakened the position of even 
important private bankers, who sat on exchanges and executed trades for clients, forcing 
them into strategic alliances with the universal banks.
149 Wealthier customers or firms 
had an incentive to use the large banks or their branches rather than their local banks, 
because the large banks had direct access to the stock market.
150 The more intermediary 
sales there were, the greater the overall costs.  In addition to lower transaction costs, the 
large banks could offer other services such as dividend collection that were harder for 
smaller private or regional banks to perform. 
Moreover,  the  authorities’  interpretation  of  the  legislation  added  to  the 
competitive advantage of the large banks vis-à-vis smaller banks.  These included the 
large  banks  ability  to  make  sales  internally  (Kompensationsgeschäfte),  which  will  be 
discussed in more detail shortly, and the higher capital requirements of the new stock 
exchange law, which effectively excluded the small and medium-sized banks from daily 
speculation and arbitrage transactions, because of higher transaction costs.
151   
Whereas banks may have been able to avoid some of the burden of the tax with 
“private”  transactions,  the  threat  of  the  new  law  was  sufficiently  important  and 
unwelcome to the banks that in 1883 the twelve major large and private banks founded 
the  Stempelvereinigung  (Vereinigung  Berliner  Banken  und  Bankiers,  which  later 
represented banks in other regulatory matters), ostensibly to clarifying the regulations 
regarding  the  application  of  the  stamp  tax,  but,  in  reality,  the  organization  actually 
lobbied for reduction of the tax, or better, yet complete exemption from it.   
The association was eventually able to win some exceptions to the law, which 
played to the strengths of the larger banks.  As discussed, one of the many advantages of 
the  larger  Berlin  banks,  which  undermined  the  competitive  position  of  smaller  local 
banks and private banks, was their large wealthy client base. Not only did this client base 
give access to funds for launching new equity and debt securities, their transaction costs 
were lower. All the big banks had to do was arrange for sales among their clients, thereby 
avoiding the stock market, which lowered overall transaction costs as well. Somewhat 
                                                 
149 Paul Wallich, Die Konzentration im Deutschen Bankwesen (Stuttgart: J.G. Cotta, 1905),pp. 83-92. 
150 Riesser, Die deutschen Groβbanken und ihre Konzentration (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1912), pp. 502-503. 
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unintentionally,  increases  in  the  Stamp  Tax  internalized  transactions  inside  banks, 
effectively turning them into a sort of silent stock exchange.  During the 1890s, the stamp 
tax was nearly doubled and a new calculation method developed that increased the cost 
and added further limitations on what would qualify as a tax free transactions on the 
exchange,  further  reinforcing  the  position  of  the  large  banks.  The  price  was  for  this 
unintended competitive benefit was the prohibition of forward sales (Terminhandel) and 
greater rights for shareholders to claim damages for losses, all of which were intended in 
the 1896 Stock Exchange Law (Börsengesetz) to reduce speculative trades.
152 
The Stock Market Law of 1896 was also a product of anti-capitalist resentment, 
agricultural concern over indebtedness, and general fears about financial capitalism.  It 
also witnessed some debate that included comments about (Jewish) conspiracies with 
international capitalism that foreshadowed Nazi attacks on capitalism. The law tried to 
impede  speculative  purchases  of  securities,  by  taxing  speculative  transactions  and 
punishing banks that engaged in them.  Although the new Stock Market Law, which 
came  into  effect  (January  1,  1897),  was  the  culmination  of  a  long  debate  about 
speculative  capitalism,  it left  many questions  about  security transactions unanswered. 
Chief among these were the rules that would be applied to transactions of shares of stock 
held by banks on behalf of their clients. Using a loophole in the Stock Market Law of 
1896,  banks  were  able  to  convince  regulators  that  securities  traded  within  the  bank 
required no stamp duty at all.  The original drafts of the law had specifically exempted 
shares deposited with banks from the rules pertaining to securities transactions. The final 
draft made no mention of them. Bankers managed to argue successfully with regulators 
that because the law was silent on the matter, in effect, that meant they were exempted. 
All this ostensibly required further clarification, but for decades there was no legislative 
action, leaving the banks and bank regulators a great deal of room for maneuver.  Some 
regulators  believed  that  how  these deposits should  be regulated should  be left  to the 
banks and to “public opinion.”  As monies deposited with the banks were necessary for 
the welfare of markets, companies as well as landed interests, regulators were prone to 
                                                 
152 Manfred Pohl, Konzentration im deutschen Bankwesen 1848-1980 (Frankfurt am Main: Fritz Knapp, 
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leave the legal loophole, as long as speculation was controlled and economic crises were 
avoided.   
In essence, the banks were entrusted to ensure that the deposits were “properly 
employed.”  In order to achieve this, banks and bankers in many regions established rules 
regarding different types of deposits, segregating those deposits that could be invested in 
risky  securities  and  those  that  could  not.
153    Banks  were  encouraged  to  make  stable 
investments, because the distinction between speculative and non-speculative was hard to 
make and because customers could sue them if any of the investments recommended by 
the bank turned sour (schief ging).
154  One important contemporary American observer 
whose expertise informed American reforms, Henry Crosby Emery, noted how much this 
Act again drove exchanges into the arms of banks.
155 
While  psychological  and  attitudinal  preferences  for  banks  rather  than  stock 
markets propelled political reforms—often against the wishes of bankers—politics and 
power ultimately explain the prohibition of futures trading.  Max Weber, chair of the 
commission regarding futures, tried to justify futures, but was overruled.  Like Weber, 
those who argued that such trading was  desirable in the interest of national strategic 
interests and competitiveness, pro-futures Americans thought such a ban would only hurt 
European exchanges. The powerful Association of Agriculturalists tipped the balance, 
which then saw the National Liberal party change its tune as they catered to their upset, 
populist voters.  Unlike the U.S. whose populist protest came from a vast mass of small 
farmers, the populist protest in Germany also had the backing of powerful aristocratic 
elite (Junkers) ensconced in the heart of government.  The act banning futures was passed 
200 to 39.  The only parties to vote against it were the liberal Independent People’s Party 
(Freisinnige Volkspartei) and, ironically, the Social Democrats.  The futures debate also 
took a decidedly contentious turn in the U.S., which eventually landed the issue at the 
pro-business  Supreme  Court  after  twenty  years  of  debate  (and  continued  effective 
trading).  The Supreme Court ruled in favor of futures as a form of hedge and insurance, 
thereby  diversifying  risk.    Like  Riesser,  the  U.s.  Supreme  Court  ruled  there  were 
                                                 
153 Johann Christian Meier, Die Entstehung des Börsengesetzes vom 22. Juni 1896 (St. Katharinen: Scripta 
Mercaturae, 1992), pp. 322-325. 
154 James, Verbandspolitik, pp. 9-10. 
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legitimate and illegitimate forms of futures trading; one needed to distinguish among 
them.
156  In contrast to Germany, the Supreme Court “diluted” public opinion to save 
futures trading. 
By  1908,  the  large  banks  and  key  private  bankers  with  seats  on  the  Berlin 
exchange  had  achieved  their  dominant  position  in  German  equity  markets.
157  With 
ordinary Germans slower to develop a faith in equity investment, German banks gave the 
German economy a way of funneling cash into risky investments, in a way that was 
quasi-equity.  That is, bank deposits promised a “regular return,” like bonds.  Such funds 
were invested into firms in the form of equity and debt, which ironically gave German 
companies more access to equity investment than in England because of the intermediary 
role played by the banks, according to Richard Tilly.
158  The combination of stock market 
reforms of the 1880s and 1890s and the banks’ powerful role in the  management of 
companies seemed to reassure investors that adequate information would be provided and 
reasonable directors would be appointed.  Confidence the 1873 crash was restored to a 
degree that individuals also bought shares, but generally through the bank.
159   
The universal banks thus solved, not perfectly but reasonably well, several classic 
economic  or  informational  dilemmas  of  corporate  governance  and  served  German 
psychological needs in particular.  The dedicated personal control of companies restored 
Germans’  faith  in  equity  investment  after  the  1873  crash  discredited  it.    In  spite  of 
considerable suspicions, one can hardly call the pre-1914 German stock exchange(s) a 
failure.  The Berlin Stock Exchange became one of the most influential exchanges in the 




Exhibit 3:  Stock Market Capitalization Relative to GDP (in %) 
                                                 
156 Borchardt, “Einleitung,” Max Weber Börsenwesen, pp. 77-81.  Levy, “Contemplating Delivery,” pp. 
332-335.  Riesser, Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der deutschen Grossbanken, p. 192. 
157 Pohl, Konzentration, pp. 180-182.  They also managed to eliminate some of the most heinous aspects of 
the 1896 law. 
158 Tilly, [cite] 103. 
159 Tilly, [cite] 104. 
160 Christoph Buchheim, “Deutsche Finanzmetropole von internationalem Rang (1870-1914),” Geschichte 
des Finanzplatzes Berlin, (Hg.) Instituts für bankhistorische Forschung von Hans Pohl (Frankfurt/Main: 
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  1913  1929  1938  1960  1980  1999 
Germany  44  35  18  35  9  67 
United States  39  75  56  61  46  152 
United Kingdom  109  138  114  106  38  225 
Canada  74  -  100  159  46  122 
France  78  -  19  28  9  117 
Italy  17  23  26  42  7  68 
Japan  49  120  181  36  33  95 
Sweden  47  41  30  24  11  177 
Switzerland  58  -  -  -  44  323 
Source: Adapted from Rajan and Zingales, “Great Reversals,” Table 3. 
 
We are aware of the considerable difficulties comparing such statistics, but the table does 
provide a ballpark comparative figure. For our purposes, we only have to demonstrate 
that German equity markets prior to 1914 were vibrant in historical perspective—in spite 
of the above constraints.  Two  caveats are in order.    First, the U.S. statistics do not 
conclude the New York Curb Exchange, which would add 10-20% more to the U.S. 
figure.  Second, in the U.S. in 1915 railroad and utility stocks accounted for 43% of 
stocks traded and 90% of bond issues.
161 But in Germany railroads and utilities were 
largely  under  public  ownership,  which  makes  the  German  ratio  that  much  more 
impressive, but it also dampened the need for good public accounting practices, which 
these two “public service” sectors propelled in the U.S.  German industrial firms raised a 
considerable amount through equity, but used the equity to take partial stakes in other 
firms and fund internal investment, while the U.S. and UK firms used the raised capital to 
fund growth through full acquisition, which increasingly led to a greater separation of 
ownership from control and larger business concentrations.
162  The bottom line is that 
Germany  before  1914  had  an  effective  hybrid  financial  system  of  banks  and  capital 
markets that makes our present day dichotomous understanding problematic.  Exhibit 3 
also demonstrates that the world of equity markets changed dramatically since 1980, so 
that  we  cannot  generalize  historically  about  schematic  bank-based  or  capital-market-
oriented developments even in the case of the U.S.   
                                                 
161  Mary  O’Sullivan,  “Theoretical  Fashions  and  Historical  Facts:  The  Expansion  of  the  US  Securities 
Markets, 1885-1930” (unpublished paper), Tables 3, 4, 
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Nevertheless, through their holding of shares for clients, which developed out of 
the Stamp Act and the Stock Exchange Law of 1896, coupled with the shareholder habit 
of delegating voting rights (Depotstimmrecht) to the banks, large commercial banks had a 
potentially  large  voice  in  the  running  of  most  German  public  companies.    Although 
Germany  had  a  hybrid  bank-based  and  capital  market  system,  key  aspects  of  bank 
mediation of the stock exchange helped to transform Germany after 1918 into a more 
bank-based system (among other Continental European countries), but it took the shocks 
of war, hyperinflation, great depression, a controlled Nazi economy, and reconstruction 
to lock these aspects in.  Unlike the U.S. war bonds drive that help to legitimize and 
popularize  securities  markets,  German  hyperinflation  simply  discredited  government 
bonds and securities as unsafe, unwise investments.  Any chance of participating in the 
“equity revolution” of the 1920s as in the U.S. was not helped by the poor showing of 
stocks in the mid-1920s and killed by the great depression.  The crisis spurred reform of 
the  savings  bank  sector  so  that  these  banks  could  more  readily  cater  to  Mittelstand 
investment, thereby strengthening banks instead of equity markets, which boomed in the 
U.S. in the 1920s.  The Nazis then made broad shareholding irrelevant.  Although there 
were some attempts to democratize shareholding (as with Mannesmann or the August 
Thyssen-Hütte  with  widely  dispersed  shareholding),  reconstruction  in  the  1950s 
effectively sluiced investment funds for firms through banks. 
   
Conclusion 
In  a  nutshell,  whereas  Germany’s  culture  and  regulatory  authorities  were 
increasingly willing to integrate banks into the ed e e onrities leaned, more and more on 
banks  for  corporate  oversight,  their  added  responrstoote  governance  by  gecorporate 
oversight  function  in  return  for  greater  privileges  and  ‘universal’  scope;  American 
attitudes in contrast, despite German influences some very German-like reasoning among 
bankers,  conditioned  just  the  opposite  response.    These  assumptions  underlying 
legislation permitted banks to play a decisive role in the future of German corporate 
governance and allowed (family) or concentrated ownership to remain strong. In the U.S., 
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involvement in corporate governance.  The U.S. took the “special path,” not Germany, in 
global perspective.  
Unlike the vilification in the U.S., and in spite of the enormous size and market 
reach of universal banks before  World  War  I at the commanding heights of German 
capitalism (Germany’s three largest enterprises as measured by capital were banks, 17 of 
the  top  25),  such  banks  were  generally  seen  as  positive  contributors  to  the  German 
economy and  general fabric of German society.
163 Through  most of the 20
th century, 
whatever criticism was directed at the large banks’ power was partially counteracted by a 
consensus that the alternative was even worse, a casino capitalisme a l’Americaine, as we 
would call it today, the speculative rule of the stock market.  The persistence of these 
corporate governance forms also indicates deep-seated attitudes toward capital markets.  
Moreover, this famous “three-pillar” structure of German banking has proved remarkably 
stable, which was partially a result of populist Mittelstand support.  Many commentators 
were struck after World War I by the degree to which German economic reforms seemed 
more designed to coordinate business and add stability during the Weimar Republic, even 
at the cost of economic efficiency.
164  When economic conditions worsened at the end of 
the 1920s, criticism of banks and their actual financial weakness led to direct government 
control of the banks, but not a reduction in their powers and scope of activity vis-à-vis 
non-financial companies.  According to the banking historian, Harold James, banks were 
under pressure in 1927 from Hjalmar Schacht, President of the Reichsbank, to reduce 
their holdings in companies, but these efforts came to naught. Even though the 1920s and 
30s witnessed a voracious attacks on big banks, they were focused mainly on the banks 
flawed  lending  strategies,  insufficient  assessment  of  risk,  and  favoritism  to  large 
companies, not the centralization of power as such—except perhaps on the Marxist left, 
who welcomed centralization for other reasons.
165  There was still widespread consensus 
in the social and economic benefits of personalized, concentrated, and responsible control 
in  the  long-term  life  of  the  enterprise.    And  many  preferred  owner  controlled, 
                                                 
163 Richard Tilly, “An overview on the role of the large German banks up to 1914,” in Finance and 
Financiers in European History 1880-1960, ed. Youssef Cassis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1992) 94. 
164  See  Robert  Brady,  The  Rationalization  Movement  in  German  Industry  (Berkeley:  University  of 
Californian Press, 1933). 
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personalized enterprises rather than anonymous joint-stock companies and speculative 
equity markets. 
Only the Nazi government ever posed a serious political threat to the universal 
banks’ privileged position with clients. They nearly wiped out the important class of 
Jewish  private  banking  houses.    But  even  the  Nazis,  during  the  early  years  of  their 
regime, used the banks’ privileged position with clients to help “coordinate” business.  
Only during the late thirties did the regime take steps to limit the effective control of 
large shareholders and bank administrators, and then mainly to coerce companies to focus 
more on military priorities and removing Jewish influence.
166  Even under the Nazis, 
there was no attempt to remove bank representation on boards, ownership of shares, and 
deposit-taking activities.  As Lothar Gall wrote, “[U]p to now, however, the state has 
never, as we have seen, intervened decisively in the universal banking system.”
167 Instead 
of splintering banks into smaller units  as in the U.S. through unit banking or Glass-
Steagall, the German solution to banking instability was to ‘universalize’ the capacity of 
savings banks and cooperatives so as to better serve their industrial clients and enhance 
liquidity within their respective banking sectors. 
To summarize: before World War I both countries were largely bank-based: firms 
had  bank  representatives  on  boards  in  roughly  equal  levels;  intermediaries  and 
relationships  supplemented  formal  accounting  information,  which  in  both  countries 
remained  an  inadequate  control  mechanism  because  of  the  lack  of  consistent  and 
sufficient detail.  Although Germany was ahead of America in requiring annual financial 
statements of public companies, both countries’ public accounting lacked a system of 
universally applied accounting principles designed to inform shareholders of the value of 
their  investments.
168    Both  countries  had  vibrant  equity  markets  of  roughly  equal 
importance  to  the  overall  economy,  but  with  some  crucial,  significant  institutional 
differences, particularly associated with banks.  Whereas banks before and after the turn 
                                                 
166 See Harold James, The Deutsche Bank and the Nazi Economic War Against the Jews (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001)  
167 Lothar Gall, “The Deutsche Bank from its Founding to the Great War,” in Gall, et al, The Deutsche 
Bank, 1870-1995 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1995) 28. 
168 See Fear and Kobrak, “Diverging Paths,” and Paul J. Maranti, Jr., Accounting Comes of Age: The 
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of the century were encouraged to help regulate companies and serve as intermediaries 
between  users  of  funds  and  investors  in  Germany,  the  U.S.  witnessed  the  opposite 
development. 
This rough congruence around 1900 began to change in the decade, especially in 
the  U.S.  with  the  “Great  Merger  Movement”  that  began  to  separate  ownership  from 
control, a series of exposés and investigations about the “money trust” after the 1901 and 
1907  panics  leading  to  the  Pujo  Commission  of  1912/13,  and  the  development  of 
accounting in “public service” industries such as railroads and utilities (nationalized in 
Germany).  Public pressure and resulting regulation helped (sometimes inadvertently) 
enhance capital markets in the U.S. in ways that increasingly encouraged a system of 
financial reporting and accountancy designed for outsiders rather than insiders.   
In the U.S., populist and progressive reactions tended to cluster around the notion 
of  fairness  and  transparency  for  outsiders  (such  as  the  “people’s  market”  of  Louis 
Brandeis, a “free and open” stock exchange, “industrial and political liberty,” “sunshine 
commission” or “blue-sky laws,” or “fair return” and “fair value” in accounting)—note 
the  language  of  regulation.    U.S.  regulators  increasingly  built  in  safeguards  to  make 
markets more transparent for investors to save them from potentially rapacious insiders 
(bankers)  abusing  “other  people’s  money.”
169  In  the  U.S.,  interlocking  directories  of 
insiders—for  years  the  standard  way  of  doing  business  in  both  countries—became 
increasingly viewed as an insidious “money trust” that had to be combated.   
In Germany, responsible insider governance was largely deemed good in order to 
“tame  speculation,”  to  manage  market  “excesses,”  to  “smooth”  inevitable  capitalist 
                                                 
169 Louis D. Brandeis, Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use It (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 
1914).    Brandeis  took  the  phrase  “other  people’s  money”  from  the  notorious  insider  speculator  and 
muckraker, Thomas Lawson, Frenzied Finance: The Crime of the Amalgamated (New York: Ridgway, 
1905).  We are grateful to Janice Traflet for this advice.  Traflet’s own work stresses that even after the 
depression and the Second World War, the New York Stock Exchange had severe legitimation issues, see 
Janice Traflet, “’Own Your Share of American Business:’ Public Relations at the NYSE during the Cold 
War,”  Business  and  Economic  History  On-Line,  Vol.  1  (2003),  pp.  1-21,  available  at 
www.thebhc.org/publications/BEHonline/2003/Traflet.pdf.    Ibid.,  “Spreading  the  Ideal  of  Mass 
Shareownership: Public Relations and the NYSE,” Essays in Economic and Business History (2004), pp. 
257-273.  Ibid., Spinning the NYSE: Power and Public Relations at the Big Board (Dissertation: Colombia 
University, 2004).  Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1984).  
Also  Julia  Ott,  When  Wall  Street  met  Main  Street:  The  Quest  for  an  Investors’  Democracy  and  the 
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volatility, and provide “solidity” to industrial enterprises.  Banks became key stewards of 
entrepreneurs  and  firms,  made  risky  industrial  ventures  respectable,  provided  better 
objective information and oversight in the economy, became dedicated shareholders, and 
acted  as  “careful  leaders”  (Riesser)  guaranteeing  the  stability  of  firms  under  firm 
guardianship.  The language is telling and signifies fundamentally different assumptions 
about  the  nature  of  capitalism.    U.S.  governance  stressed  primarily  transparency  and 
openness,  while  the  Germans  stressed  responsibility  and  solidity.    Both  solutions, 
however, addressed universal, classic problems of corporate governance. 
The U.S. hardly moved smoothly to a capital market system, but such language 
and the underlying assumptions pointed the way to the future.  The U.S. struggled for 
another 20 years with issues of private property and federalism, before an alternative to 
bank-based capitalism could be started.  Only in the wake of the Roaring Twenties did 
sufficient  political  consensus  arise  around  a  new  approach  to  satisfying  the  often-
conflicting demands of the progressives, populists, and business leaders.   In some sense, 
1929 became for Americans what 1873 had been for Germans: a catalyst for molding an 
“American” regulatory alternative to uncontrolled capital markets and concentrations of 
economic power. Within a decade of the Crash, banks and other financial institutions 
were, to a large extent, out of the corporate governance business.   In their place was a 
fragile  but  lasting  coalition  of  legislators,  government-appointed  regulators,  private 
markets,  and  professional  organizations,  whose  principle  aim  was  to  create  enough 
transparency in capital markets for intelligent investors to make reasonable decisions 
about the economic value of securities. 
  A good argument could be made that in both countries banks served to mitigate 
market imperfections.  As Eugen White noted nineteenth century banks in all countries 
had a “special relationship” to firms.  Without their intervention, it is unlikely that firms 
would have been able to geographically and contractually expand their sources of capital.  
From the moment companies and owners felt compelled to move from internal sources or 
private equity and very simple forms of short-term financing, new sources and securities 
had to be invented and for-the-most part distant investors had to be convinced that their 
investments  had  a  reasonable  chance  of  bearing  fruit.    For  a  long  time  finance  has 
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their indifference propositions to hold did not reflect the real world and that companies 
having many good economic reasons for choosing from alternative forms of financing.  
Less  is  known  about  how  institutional  development  has  facilitated  the  broadening  of 
choices and investor confidence.   
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